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ABSTRACT 
The end of the Cold War in the early 1990s led to a multilateral international system no 
longer divided by contending forces of capitalism and communism. In the context of 
South Africa, the end of the Cold War occurred at a juncture where the apartheid 
government was being challenged by pro-democracy forces that have fought against it for 
decades. The developments in the international system and in the country led to South 
Africa adopting universal liberal values not only in its constitution, but also in its 
international relations. Foreign policy documents and statements by the ministry of 
Foreign Affairs also reflected the country 's aspiration of becoming a mediator, a 
facilitator for democracy and a peacemaker especially in the context of Africa. 
International expectation mounted as South Africa was perceived as possessing the 
capacity to act in a manner that advances democratic values and which gives voice to the 
weak nations of the world. However, the aura of a post-apartheid South Africa that would 
act not only in its interest, but also in the interest of the world commnnity never fully 
materialised. South Africa failed to act in a manner consistent with its stated commitment 
to democratic values when it recognised Peoples Republic of China, an undemocratic and 
repressive government. It also marched into Lesotho in 1998, resulting in the 
destabilisation of this tiny Southern African country. These events led to an increasing 
criticism of the South African government. Some argued that South Africa was still 
inexperienced given its recent emergence as a world player. Others blamed the 
inconsistency on a too broad and ambitious foreign policy that set itself for failure. 
This study seeks to conh'ibute to the conceptual understanding of the debate regarding the 
ambiguous nature of South Africa's foreign policy behaviour. It situates the 
conceptualisation of South Africa's foreign policy within the predominant debates in 
international relations between realism, political structuralism and pluralism. Firstly, it 
holds that the end of the Cold War and ascendancy of globalist conceptions of 
international relations did not lead to the inadequacy of political structuralism as an 
organising framework. Secondly, it attempts to clarify the gap between South Africa's 
II 
foreign policy and foreign policy behaviour by employing the assumptions advanced by 
political structuralism, Thirdly, a case study of South Africa's foreign policy towards 
China, Lesotho, the Great Lakes and Swaziland is carried out. Here it is demonstrated 
that the ambiguities of South Africa's foreign policy are a function of the consh'aints 
imposed by the political and economic structure of the international system, It draws its 
conclusion by providing methodological recommendations to South Africa 's foreign 
policy makers and future researchers in the field of foreign policy analysis, 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Context of the research 
The end of the Cold War led to a rapid and significant change in the international 
system!. The changes that took place included the decline in the conflict-ridden relations 
between states, a decline of military issues and the ascendancy of social, environmental 
and economic issues. Social and economic issues relegated to the background during the 
Cold War gained primacy in the international agenda. Issues of development growth, 
equity and human development became the most pressing issues in international politics2 
The dichotomy between domestic and international politics got eroded. Domestic and 
foreign policies were no longer put in separate compartments, as had been the case during 
States also became aware of commonality of interests between themselves and started 
co-operating towards the betterment of the international system of states. Despite the fact 
that states remained sovereign, foreign policy analysts began preoccupying themselves 
with issues of progressive democracy such as respect for human rights and human 
security" These values were not only espoused rhetorically, but also entrenched in 
I According to Waltz, a political structural1st the intemational system of states is an anarchic entity that has 
an ordering principle in that it makes states functionally simi lar. He also defines it in tenns of distribution 
of power amongst its units (states). 
, Steel, R. 1995. "The Domestic Core of Foreign Policy", The Atlantic Online (ww.theatlantic.com/), p. 3 
3 Steel argues that, "our domestic troubles are not in a realm separate from our foreign policy", p. 3. 
4 Human security includes issues slich as war crimes against particular ethnic and gender groups, 
environmental justice, poverty and social equahty. They signal a move away from traditional security 
issues to putting people as the focus of security analysis. The traditional security issues concerned 
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forums in which states negotiate and co-operate. These forums include governmental 
organisations such as the United Nations (UN), multilateral institutions such as the World 
Trade Organisations (WTO), the Commonwealth and the Organisation of African Unity 
(OAU). 
This changing nature of the international system from a state centred one to one 
characterized by non-state actors led to opening up of state borders. As states 
democratised, powerful groups that were once undennined by the primacy of states were 
unleashed 5 Non-states actors within and outside individual state borders became active 
and influenced the course of international events. States that were once used as an arena 
for proxy wars between the superpowers started grappling with internal strife in an 
attempt to fit themselves within this changing international conjuncture. 
Change is an important factor in the study of international relations. The changing 
international system led to the emergence of a number of dominant themes in the study of 
International Relations in the 19905. It not only impacted on the structure of the 
international system, processes and actors, it also had inevitable implications for the 
manner in which International Relations was studied6 
themselves with state's national security . See Kilgour, D. "The UN and the challenge of hurnan security", 
remarks by secretary of state to the UN Association in Canada, February 18,2000. 
s Intel11 ational pol1tics ceased being the one defined by Hans Morgenthau "is a struggle for power between 
states". See Morgenthall, H. "A Realist Theory of International Relations", in J. Vasques. 1990. Classics of 
lntemational Relations. Prentice Hall : New Jersey 
6 Buzan, B. 1991. People, States and Fear: An agenda for International Security in the Post Cold War Era. 
New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf, p. 1. According to him change li es at the heart of effective enquiry 
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The transformation that took place in the late 1980s and early 1990s also posed critical 
questions for theories premised on the state as a primary referent in international politics7 
Blurring state borders, the break down in the dichotomy between international and 
domestic politics and the prominence of non-state actors created a far more 
interdependent world. Scholars such as Keohane and Nye began arguing that state-centric 
perspectives were becoming an "anachronism" in that they could only partially explain 
the emerging architecture of international politics8 It is against this background that 
debates between realists, political structuralists and pluralists gained new momentum. 
These debates revolved around what ought to be the unit of analysis in the study of 
International Relations. 
In South Africa, the abolition of apartheid also ushered in an era of dramatic change. 
South Africa stopped being a state isolated from the world to a one recognised 
internationally. With the introduction of democracy in 1994, South Africa began 
conducting its foreign policy in a manner that promoted its democratic culture globall/. 
Fonnal relations were entered into with a diversity of states and South Africa started 
participating in broader issues that did not necessarily affect its national securityl O 
Commentators began arguing that, "South Africa's foreign relations should be 
7 Naidoo. S. 1997. New Rules for Security and Survival: Southern Africa's Adaptation to a Changing 
World Environment. Rhodes University MA Thesis: South Africa, p. 4. 
8 Keohane, R. & Nye, J. 1989. Power and Interdependence. Harper Collin s: San Francisco. Also see Clark , 
I. 1999. Globalisatiol1 an International Relations Theory. Oxford University Press: USA, p. 2. 
<) Venter, D. "South African Foreign Po licy In A Time of Change: The Africa Dimension", Journal of Third 
World Spectrum 5, No.2 (Fall 1998), p. 14. 
10 South Africa has participated in many international issues such as the Ban Landmine Treaty, extension of 
the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and brokering of peace treaties in Africa. See Muller, M and Carlsnaes, 
W. 1997. Change and South Africa's External Relations ITP:(SA, p. 73. 
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understood in the context of an international move away from geopolitics of conflict and 
war to that of peace and cooperation"". 
In tandem with the political change, South African international relations thinking took a 
drastic turn in the immediate aftermath of the 1994 elections. It was now argued that 
South African foreign policy could be fully situated within approaches that share a global 
rather than a state-centric conceptualisation,,12 Foreign policy analysts refer to South 
Africa 's foreign policy as having evolved in a manner that promotes universal liberal 
values and its democratic political culture globally. 
International politics after the 1990s is explained adequately by pluralism, in that they 
dislodge the nation state as a unit of analysis. They criticise the notion that the state 
should be the unit of analysis in the study of international relations. This conception of 
international relations advanced by pluralists such as Burton lJ, which talks of the multi-
form and multi-agenda character of international politics gained prominence amongst 
foreign policy analysts. This led to relations between states and non-state actors being 
conceptualised as forming an interdependent international society. Due to this nature of 
international relations the gap between domestic and international politics increasingly 
became be non-existent in the writings of pluralist thinkers. This led to the conception 
that a democratic country like South Africa was infonned by its internal political culture 
in the conduct of its foreign relations. This conception placed no emphasis on the foreign 
II Du Plessis. A. " A Geopolitical Context: A Sea of Change from Old to New Geo-politics", in M .. Mulier 
and IV. Carlsnaes. 1997. Change and South Africa 's Extemal Relations. ITP : South Africa, p.1 7. 
12 Muller, M. & Carisnaes, W. Change and South Africa's External Relations. ITP: South Africa, p. 73. 
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policies of states except conceiving of international politics as a web of relations in which 
states no longer playa dominant role!4. This analysis amounts to a mere description of 
what the intemational system looks like. It does not address the preoccupation with 
survival by individual states and the unequal nature of relations. It is this conception that 
this work finds problematic. 
1.2 Problem Statement 
The VIew that international politics is a complex web of relations characterised by 
declining relevance of foreign policies of states does not account for the constraints 
inherent in this very system. It cannot be inferred that due to dissolving borders, domestic 
politics of states are seamlessly linked to international politics. Furthermore, the belief 
that there exists a web of relations between states without any qualifications, fai ls to 
account for the constraints that states big and small contend with in the international 
system. By the same token, South African foreign policy cannot be understood if the 
structure of the international system within which it operations is completely ignored. 
The changing international system of the late 1980s and early 1990s led to the 
blossoming of liberal democracies across the world. In the context of South Africa, the 
changing international system of the 1990s meant that injustices such as apartheid could 
no longer be accommodated. It can be argued that the demise of apartheid South Africa 
13 Plurali sts such as Burton. Keohane and Nye saw the international system as being based on a variety of 
relationships and not on states on ly. See Salmon. T. Issues in International Relations. Routll!dge: London, 
p. 303. 
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can at least be partly explained in terms of the international environment, whose balance 
of forces was also changing. Shifting balance of forces meant that South Africa could no 
longer justify an apartheid state. Pressure imposed by the international course of events 
compelled South Africa to abandon apartheid; it was no longer supported by the 
international political structure l5 
Nevertheless, the change that took place after 1990 in the international system did not 
yield an order enforcing authority l6 All states, including democracies such as South 
Africa are still squarely placed in the ambit of an anarchical international system. The 
change in the contours of global politics in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War did 
not mean that states ceased to be constrained by the structural imperatives of the 
international political system. Strategic factors still play a role in foreign policies of 
states. South Africa desires to champion liberal values of human rights, freedom, self-
... 
determination, democracy and development. However, it is thwarted by systemic 
constraints of anarchy, which require it to put strategic factors to the fore. This partly 
explains why South Africa speaks of human rights and at the same time behaves in a 
manner that seemingly contradicts its stated foreign policy goals. 
" Viotti , P & Kauppi, M. 1987. International Relations Theory: Realism, Pluralism, Globalism and 
~eyond. Macmillan Publishing Company, Inc!: USA, p. 228. 
J The contribution played by domestic forces is acknowledged, but intematl0nal pressure also paid 
dividends in the fight against apartheid. See Vale, P. "Whose world is it anyway? International Relations in 
South Africa", in M. Dyer & L. Mangasarian 1989. The Study of International Relations: The State of the 
Alt. Macmillan: London, p. 206. 
16 According to Waltz change of the 19905 did not yield an international community of states due to the 
absence of a binding international authoIity independent of states. See Waltz, K. 1988. Military Power and 
International politics. Langham, Md: University Press of America, p. 626. 
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South Africa rejoined the international system of states not as an all-powerful state. It still 
has to find a niche and gain a meaningful voice in the international system. Situated in 
the developing world, which is increasingly made insecure by problems such as 
indebtedness, repressive governments, conflict l7 and epidemics such as AIDS, the 
constraints imposed by the environment within which it operates tend to weigh more 
heavily on cOlllltries of its stature l8 
1.3 Objectives of this study 
This study poses analytical questions regarding the conceptualisation of South Africa's 
foreign policy. It situates South Africa's foreign policy within the dominant theoretical 
debates of realism, pluralism and political structuralism. The objective here is to assess 
and demonstrate the continued relevance of the assumptions of political structuralism 
over pluralist ones l9 This is done in an attempt to conceptualise the foreign policy 
ambiguities 20 within the context of the systemic constraints imposed on South Africa by 
the political and economic structure of the international system. A limited number of case 
studies are used to test the hypothesis that the lack of a coherent foreign policy is a 
function of systemic constraints. It is believed that it is through llllderstanding these 
17 According to the Great Lakes Policy Forum Report, "Africa is ravaged by an integrated zone of conflicts 
that rUlls from Angola through Sudan crossing the Great Lakes region", 2 December 1999. Conflicts are by 
110 means confined to this region, since there are other con flicts in places like, Sierra Leone, Eritrea, Ango la 
and 1 vary Coast. 
IS Schrire, R. & Silke, D. "Foreign Policy: the domestic context" in Muller, M &Carlsnaes, W 1997. 
Change in South Africa's extemal relations. ITP: SA, p. 3. 
19 Note that political structuralism is an extension on what had been the basic assumptions of realism. This 
means that realism has some continued relevance for instance in so far as it acknowledged the importance 
of the nation state in international relations. See Waltz , K. "Evaluating Theories". American Political 
S cience Review, 91 , December 1997, p. 91 4. 
20 Pfister, R. 2000. South Africa's Recent Foreign Policy Towards Africa: Issues and Li terature .CIS: 
Zurich, p. 12 
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constraints that a coherent foreign policy can be formulated . The international system 
shows elements of continuity and renders political structuralism a relevant analytical 
framework. Whilst the growing relevance of pluralist assumptions is acknowledged, their 
dominance in international relations cannot explain the persistence of the international 
state system. 
1.4 Limitations of this study 
This study limits itself to the analysis of foreign policy vis-a-vis foreign policy behaviour. 
It acknowledges the pertinence of other sources of foreign policy such as institutions2l 
and the bureaucratic process of foreign policy making. However, it confines itself to a 
conception of the rift between foreign policy and actual foreign policy behaviour. 
Secondly, it does this with reference to secondary literature. Finally, in its case study 
approach it selects a limited number of cases, which illustrate, but do not purport to 
exhaust all the pertinent case studies regarding South Africa's foreign policy conduct. 
1.5 Structure of this study 
The next four chapters propose to take the debates introduced above further, with a view 
to testing the hypothesis that South Africa's foreign policy behaviour is a function of the 
constraints imposed by the political and economic structure of the international system. 
2 1 Departments other than the Department of Foreign Affairs have played a pivotal role in South Africa 's 
intcmational re lations, e.g. Department of Trade and Industry (OTI). However foreign policy here is 
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Chapter two assesses the debates between realism, political structuralism and pluralism. 
The objective of this undertaking is to demonstrate the continued relevance of the 
political structuralism in the analysis of South Africa foreign policy. 
Chapter three examines South Africa's foreign policy against its foreign policy behaviour. 
The purpose of such an examination is to demonstrate that the contradiction between the 
two can be explained in terms of structural imperatives of the international system. 
Chapter [our, usmg a case study approach, tests the hypothesis that contradictions 
between South Africa's foreign policy and foreign policy behaviour can be explained in 
terms of structural imperatives and the distribution of capabilities amongst states in the 
international system. 
Chapter five constitutes the concluding section and endeavours to draw together and 
summarise the various arguments and findings of this study. 
deliberately viewed as an integrated govemment undertaking rather than through the various efforts of 
individual departments. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
SOUTH AFRICAN FOREIGN POLICY IN THE CONTEXT OF PREDOMINANT 
DEBATES IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 
2.1 Introduction 
As much as the end to the Cold War brought change to the international system, the end of 
apartheid brought in a different foreign policy context for South Africa. The struggle against 
apartheid was a struggle against a crime against humanity, discrimination and injustices. After 
1994 the country became a constitutional democracy and adopted liberal principles as the 
cornerstone of its foreign policy. Foreign policy not only took into account domestic issues, but 
also prioritised the promotion of democracy, human rights, sustainable people-centred 
development and issues of peace and peace building both in Africa and internationally 1 
However, a number of occasions South Africa conducted itself in a manner that contradicts 
these foreign policy goals. As such, one of the difficult challenges facing South Africa has 
been that of maintaining consistency between its foreign policy discourse and practice. It has 
been argued that South Africa's foreign policy behaviour is vague, erratic and inconsistent2 
This inconsistency occurs against a backdrop of domestic challenges such as a precarious 
social and economic base3• 
I Le Pere et al argue that South Aflica's foreign policy has been ". vacillitating between realist and moral 
intemationalism". See Ie Pere, G, Lambrechts K, & van Nieuwkerk, A. "The burden of the future: South Aliica's 
foreign policy challenges in the new millennium". Global Dialogue 4.3, December 1999, p.l. 
1 Pfister, R 2000. South Africa 's Foreign Policy Towards Africa: Issues and Literature. CIS: Zurich, p. 12. 
1 South Africa maintains a medium human development ranking on the UNDP index, has great income inequali ty, 
joblessness and worsening crime on which the government is also expected to deliver. See Le Pere et ai., "The 
burden of the future: South Aliica's foreign policy challenges in the new millennium". Global Dialogue 4.3 , 
December 1999, p.3. 
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Despite being a democratic country South Africa therefore faces challenges. These include the 
inability to unambiguously coordinate and globally promote values consistent with its 
democratic internal disposition. Some have argued that such an inconsistency is a reflection of 
complacency on South Africa's part. Others are convinced that the discourse that espouses 
values such as human rights is only a rhetoric that has no real substance to it4. South Africa's 
failure to practically implement coherent foreign policy is deeper than these comments suggest. 
An explanation is to be found in broader theoretical issues seldom cited by foreign policy 
analysts. The theoretical issues revolve around the predominant debates in international 
relations as to the relevance of the three schools of thought namely realism, pluralism and 
political structuralism in describing the current reality. Their different assumptions regarding 
the unit of analysis in international relations, is pertinent in explaining the ambiguities in South 
Afi-ica's foreign policy. 
This chapter seeks to examine the erratic nature of South Africa's foreign policy by situating it 
within the intellectual debates of these predominant theories of international relations. Such an 
undertaking is aimed at assessing how these schools of thought conceptually explain the 
inconsistencies in South Africa's foreign policy. Firstly, an outline of the basic assumptions put 
forward by these schools of thought is given. Secondly, an attempt is made to demonstrate that 
political structuralism continues to explain international politics adequately despite the 
criticism levelled against it by pluralists5. Thirdly, it wishes to show that international politics 
4 Solomon, H. "South Africa's foreign policy and middle power leadership", Institute for Secm;ty Studies 
Monograph 13, Fairy God Mother, Hegemon or Partner? May 1997. 
5 According to Keohane and Nyc, " the old intc111atlonal patterns have crumbled and the traditional agenda no longer 
defines our perils". See Keohane, Rand Nye, 1. 1989. Power and In terdependence. Harper Collins Publishers: USA, 
p. 3. 
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is indeed complex and as such no single set of assumptions can wholly explain it6 Whilst the 
relevance of pluralist assumptions is acknowledged, it is argued that political structuralism 
continues to be of pertinent relevance in the analysis of South African foreign policy. 
2.2 Predominant debates in International Relations 
Among the dominant debates in international relations has been the debate between state-
centric theories and theories of complex interdependence put forward by realists and pluralists. 
At the heart of these debates has been the fundamental dispute regarding the unit of analysis 
and motives for state behaviour7 
Since the 1940s realism or the "power politics school of thought has dominated international 
relations8 Realists focus on the individual state as the primary referent in international 
relations . During the Cold War, which was characterised by conflicts between states, the 
assumptions of realism proved relevant in explaining the nature of international politics. Due 
to changes in the international system there emerged an intense debate between realists and 
pluralists who saw the state as becoming superseded by non-state actors. Realism was seen as 
incapable of explaining the burgeoning social and economic relations in a world in which state 
borders were becoming porous. Pluralists began arguing that an interdependent world in which 
non-state actors were primary actors in shaping world politics was emerging. This debate later 
' Keohane, R & Nye, J. 1989. Power and In terdependence. Harper Collins Publishers: USA , p. 4. Also see l'lagan, J. 
"Domestic Explanations in the analysis of foreign policy", in L. Neack, J.A.K Hey & P.J . Haney. 1995. Foreign 
po licy analysis: Continuity and change in its second generation. Prentice-Hall : New Jersey, p. 12. 
1 Maghooti , R and Ramberg, B. 1982. Globalism verSLIS Realism: International Relations ' Third Debate. Westview 
Press: USA. 
8 Evans, G. & Newnham, J. 1998. Penguin Dictionary of International Relations. Penguin Books: USA, p. 465. 
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drew on political structuralism, which became a critique and an intellectual extension of 
realism9 This school of thought maintained a state-centric view, but directed attention to the 
political structure of the international system as the primacy unit of analysis . This debate was 
made more intense by the developments of 1990, the unexpected end of the Cold War and the 
fall of the Berlin Wall, which seemed to go against the assumptions of realism. 
In the context of South Africa this same debate can be situated in the alleged differences 
between apartheid and post-apartheid foreign policy. During apartheid, the nature of politics in 
South Africa led to the pursuit of a realist perspective'O It is argued that, "the period 1948 to 
1994 saw a foreign policy that was dramatically simple, based on single issue strategies to 
ensure the survival of the white regime"". The foreign policy strategies that were adopted in 
the mid 1980s such as "Total National Strategy" were indicative of a preoccupation with 
national security issues. This foreign policy context influenced the nature of South Africa's 
International Relations as a discipline. Vale argues that, " ... most published work in South 
Africa was in the realist genre"'2. As such, it was argued that some academics in the country 
became servants of the South African apartheid government. This meant that their analysis of 
intemational politics and view of foreign policy inevitably revolved around the preservation of 
the South Afi"ican state. 
, Viotti, P & Kauppi, M. 1987. International Relations Theory: Realism, Pluralism, Globalism and Beyond. 
Macmillan Publishing Company, Inc: USA, p. 230. 
10 Vale, P. "Whose World Is It Anyway? International Relations in South Africa", in M. Dyer & L. Mangasarian. 
1989 The Study of International Relations: The State of the A11. Macmillan: London. 
" Evans, G. "South Africa Foreign Policy After Mandel.", Round Table. October 1999 (352). 
12 Vale, P. "Whose World Is It Anyway? International Relations in South Africa", in M. Dyer & L. Mangasarian 
1989. The Study of International Relations: The State of The Art. Macmillan: London (p. 206). 
13 
However, with the end of apartheid, international relations thinking took a drastic tum in South 
Africa. Analysts now argue that South African foreign policy can be fully situated within 
approaches that share a global rather than a state-centric conceptualisation,,13 They refer to 
South Africa's foreign policy as having evolved to promote universal liberal values and a 
democratic political culture globally. It is the extent to which South Africa can succeed or live 
up to its desire to externally promote values entrenched in progressive liberal democratic 
constitution of 1996 that this study seeks to problematise. Here the question of whether the 
structural imperatives of the international system will allow South Africa to play an influential 
role is crucial. 
It is argued that the foreign policy behaviour of states is not necessarily a reflection of their 
internal composition due to restraints imposed by the international system. South Africa's 
desire to promote human rights, freedom, self-deternlination and equality globally does not 
mean that its foreign policy behaviour will always be in favour of these values. We now 
proceed to examine basic assumption of realism, political structuralism and pluralism. 
2.3 Realism 
Realism advances a number of assumptions about international relations. They argue that the 
key point of departure in the study of international relations is the state. International 
organisations such as the United Nations (UN) and multinational corporations (MNC's) playa 
minimal role in international politics. This means that they define international relations as the 
!3 Venter, D. "South Africa and Africa: Relations in a time of change", in M. Muller 1997 Change South Africa's 
extemal relations. Halfway House, Thompson. 
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study of inter-state relations l4 The state is viewed by realists in the context of a metaphorical 
hard-shell. This means that they make a distinction between international politics and domestic 
politics. In their analysis, domestic politics has no relevance in the study of international 
relations, because what happens within the boundaries of the state has little influence on how 
states behave in the international system. They propose that the purpose of state is national 
survival; thus the maximisation of power is a rational and inevitable goal of foreign policy. As 
suggested by Hans Morgenthau, the notion of international politics as a struggle for power is 
central in the realist conception of international relations 1s. 
Realists argue that the international system is anarchic in that states answer to no higher 
authority. This means that they must fend for themselves and protect their interests to ensure 
survival 16 A country's national interest according to realists is the "maximisation of power to 
the virtual exclusion of issues such as the promotion of ideological values or of moral 
principles,, 17 Instead of trying to promote moral issues, states seek to influence others towards 
a preferred direction and to avoid any influence on their own behaviour. South Africa 's foreign 
policy under apartheid was premised on this kind of thinking. States in the region were 
influenced or coerced into behaving in a manner that served the protection of an apartheid 
14 Waltz, K argues that so long as the intemational system with a central order enforcing authority has not emerged 
anarchy is still a relevant conceptual narrati ve. See Waltz, K. 1988. Military Power and Intemational Politics. 
Lanham, MD: University Press of America, p. 626. 
15 Morgenthau, H. "Realist Theory of International Relations" in J. Vasquez 1990. Classics of Intemational 
Relations (2'" ed). Prentice Hall: New York, p. 33. 
16 Realists refer to this as a, "system of self-help". See Evan s, G and Newnham, J. Penguin Dictionary of 
International Relations. Penguin Books: USA, p. 464 . 
• , Evans, G. & Newnham, J. ibid, p. 466. 
18 South Africa coerced its neighbours in the fonn of Total National Strategy to accept the apartheid South African 
state. See Mi lls, G. 1994. From Pariah to Participant: South Aflica 's Evolvin g Foreign Relations, 1990- 994 . SA IIA, 
Jan Smuts House: Johannesburg, p. 11 . 
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Since realists regard the state as the primary referent in international relations, the role of 
domestic factors in decision-making processes within states is given secondary importance. 
South Africa for them is a coherent l9 state whose foreign policy has nothing to do with the 
internal political process. They argue that liberal values in foreign policy are used selectively 
so long as they serve the purpose of helping South Africa improve its power position. The 
United States during the Cold War for example condemned countries like China for human 
rights violations. Support by the United States of dictatorial regimes in the Western sphere of 
influence was not free of human rights violations, but nonetheless it used the human rights 
issue to discredit communist states. Realist would view the inconsistency in South Africa 's 
foreign policy as a product of desire by South Africa to improve its power position rather than 
with the promotion of liberal values. 
One of the central assumptions of realism is that of self-interestedness of states. States 
according to realists tend to manipulate the behaviour of others towards a direction that puts 
them at an advantage20 The projection of universal liberal values is thus interpreted as a 
rhetoric behind which South Africa seeks to maximise its gains or influence. It can also be 
argued that as a rational actor, South Africa calculates its capabilities and realises that the 
projection of liberal values serves its national interest. The contradiction between foreign 
policy and foreign policy behaviour is due to the fact that South Africa is not preoccupied with 
19 Keohane, R & Nyc, J. 1989. Power and Interdependence. Harper Collins: USA, p. 23 
20 Evans, G & Ncwnham, J. op.cit, p. 465. 
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the actual implementation of foreign policy discourse, but uses it so long as it serves national 
interest21 . 
Realism points out that cooperation is possible, but only when it serves the purpose of fulfilling 
national self-interest22 States take part in global forums such as multilateral international 
organisations with a view to manipulating the international environment to their benefit. In this 
vein, South Africa's struggle for the cause of the weaker states in the South for instance, can be 
interpreted as a calculated move, aimed at augmenting its relatively weak position in the 
international system23 Realists argue that the contradiction between foreign policy discourse 
and foreign policy behaviour is a product of being self-interested. 
2.4 Political Structuralism 
Political structuralism emerged in the 1970s as a response to the challenges posed by 
interdependency theory against a state-centric conceptualisation of international politics24 It is 
both a critique and an extension of realism, and is hence a strand ofrealist theor/5 In the late 
twentieth century political structuralism has contributed as one of the most influential 
intellectual movements in the study of international relations. Political structuralism advances 
21 According to the Penguin Dictionary of International Relations, Unational Interest refers to the goals or objectives 
offoreign policy". See Evans, G. & Newnham, 1. op.cit, p.344. 
22 Evans, G. & Newnham, J. Penguin Dictionary of Intemational Relations. Penguin Books: USA, p.466. 
2J South Aftica has endeavours to insert the needs and interests of Southcm Africa, Africa and Third World in 
general as a pliority on the agendas of forums such as the UNCTAD, NAM and the WTO. It has commi tted itself to 
solidarity with other developing countries. See Le Pere, G. Lambrechts, K. & Van Nieuwkerk, A. Ie Perc, G, 
Lambrechts K, & van Nicuwkerk, A. "The burden of the future: South Africa's foreign policy challenges in the new 
millennium". Global Dialogue 4.3, December 1999, p. 3. 
24 Burchill, Sand Linklater A. 1996. TheOlies of Intemational Relations. St Martin 's Press, p. 83. 
15 Kenneth Waltz and John Mearsheimer are Political Strllcturali sts who drew from Realism in formulating their 
theory. This makes Political Structuralism a strand of Realism in that its shares the fundamental paradigmatic 
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certain fundamental assumptions regarding the level of analysis in the study of international 
relations. Firstly, they reject the unit level of analysis because it fails to account for constraints 
imposed by the structural conditions on the individual units . They thus adopt the systemic level 
of analysis. They do accept the state-centred character of the international system, which lacks 
central authority. However, the decisive influence of political structure of this international 
system is regarded as the most pertinent aspect in explaining state behaviour. States interact 
arnongst each other, but the outcome of those interactions is detennined by the structural 
conditions of the international system2" . States are thus made functionally similar despite the 
fact that they have different internal structures. 
Secondly, political structuralists argue that the international system is also characterised by the 
unequal distribution of power or capabilities among its units. This leads to states struggling for 
survival and accumulation of power as a systemic requirement. Waltz, a political structuralist 
argues that "each state pursues its own interests, however defined, in ways it judges best27., . 
Finally, political structuralism does mention economic issues and the existence of non-state 
actors . However these entities are seen as subordinates to states. 
Political structuralism interprets South Africa's foreign policy in terms of an anarchic 
international system and not at a unit level of analysis. At the end of apartheid there was a lot 
assumptions with Realists such as Morgenthall , Niebuhr and Carr. In this study the term poli tical stTucturali sm, 
whi ch is used by authors interchangeab ly with the term structural realism will be emp loyed. 
26 Waltz, K. 1979. Theory of International Politics. Random House: New York 
27 Kenneth Waltz is a fo unding father of structural ism. See Waltz, K. 1979. Theory of Intemational Politics. New 
York: Random House 
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of euphoria over South Africa becoming a beacon of hope in the continent28• Its 
democratisation was perceived as an opportunity that will fuel the winds of democratic change 
across Africa. However, in the immediate aftelmath of the 1994 elections, South Africa's 
desire to promote its democratic values globally was thwarted by the inability to influence 
partners closer to home. It realised that its relations could not be based purely on the promotion 
of liberal values. On the contrary, other interests such as trade relations had to be pursued29 
Political structuralism interprets the contradiction between South Africa's foreign policy and 
foreign policy behaviour as consequence of systemic constraints of anarchy. South Africa 
rejoined an intemational system of anarchy when official relations were opened after 1994. 
Despite the desire to promote democratic values of human rights, freedom and equality 
globally, South Africa is compelled just like the other states to take charge of its own survival. 
It is in this context that South Africa's foreign policy is elTatic and vague. It is because it seeks 
to promote liberal values in a system in which states pursue their national self-intereseo The 
similarity between realism and political structuralism is that they both consider foreign policy 
as an arena of the state. However, as indicated, political structuralism has extended realism 
giving it capacity to capture and explain the changes that have taken place in the intemational 
system since the 1990s. 
28 South Africa got involved early in the 19905 in attempts of bringing about constitutionalism in Africa. as was the 
case in Lesotho. This elevated the expectations of the international community. 
29 See chapter fOllr for a detailed analysis of cases where South Africa did not act in accordance with its foreign 
policy content in ini tiating relations with other countries e.g. China and Sale of arms to Great Lakes and India at the 
height of the East Timorese conflict. 
,\0 States are made functionally similar by the ordering principle of tile intematlonal system. See Waltz, K. 1988 
Military Powedn Intelllational Politics. Lanham, Md: University Press of America, p. 86. 
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Secondly, South Africa 's foreign policy can be explained by political structuralism in tenns of 
its position in the international system. The intemational system determines the power 
capabilities of states) [. The position of a state in the intemational system therefore determines 
the extent to which it can achieve its stated goals. A middle power32 like South Africa, situated 
in the developing world, is compelled more often than not to succumb to the structural 
constraints of the intemational system. Schrire and Silke put this point eloquently when they 
argue that, 
"Domestic and foreign policies are inevitably interlinked, however the 
strength of that relationship depends upon the distribution of power 
within the global system. Where states are dominant, domestic factors 
tend to be important in shaping foreign policies, whi le conversely for 
small states the restraints imposed by the global system tend to weigh 
more heavily""-
In tenns of foreign policy discourse, South Africa aims high. However, its middle power status 
and relative resource potential limit it from achieving its stated foreign policy goals. South 
Africa desires to involve itself in world issues such as an equitable economic system, the 
alleviation of poverty and non-nuclearity. Its foreign policy loses focus due to its inabili ty to 
amass the resources necessary for the achievement of these ambitious goals. The international 
31 Political structuralists argue, " that the international system is characteri sed by a desire to accumulate power as a 
systemi c requirement". See Burchi ll , Sand Linklater, A. 1996. Theories of International Relations. St Martin 's Press 
p.87. 
32 According to Cooper, Higgot and Nossal, «middle powers are to be found in the middle rank of material 
capabilities, both military and economic, and that they seek to bolster international institutions for co-operative 
management". South Africa has the features of both a developing and a developed country and thus qualifies as a 
middle power. It also shows inclination towards cooperation rather than unilateral assertion of its influence. See 
Solomon, H. "South Africa 's foreign policy and middle power leadership", in ISS Monograph 13, Fairy God 
Mother, Partner or Hegemon? May 1997. Also see Cooper, A.F. 1997. Niche Diplomacy: Middle powers after the 
Cold War. Macmill an: London. 
n Schore, R. &Silke, D. "Foreign Policy: The Domestic Context", in M. Muller and W. Carlsnaes 1997. Change 
end South Africa's Extemal Relations. ITP: SA, p. 3. 
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system IS such that influence comes with econorruc muscle34 . Preoccupation with the 
accumulation of resources necessary for economic growth forces South Africa to give priority 
to the strengthening of its economic position at the expense of liberal values. In a nutshell, 
South Africa ' s success in promoting its domestic values abroad is determined by the fact that it 
has to fend for itself in a competitive international context. Inconsistencies in foreign policy are 
therefore inevitable outcomes of being part of the international system that lacks central 
authority and in which states seek to amass wealth and power. 
2.5 Pluralism 
At the end of the Cold War the debate between dominant schools of international relations 
intensified. International politics and the structure of international relations were seen as 
drastically transforming. The emergence of non-state actors such as international organisations 
and multinational corporations (MNC's) led to the assault on the central thesis of state-centred 
conceptualisation. The permeability of state borders and internationalisation of transactions 
made inter-state relations inaccurate indicators of international politics. The notion that the 
state is an impermeable and sovereign unit no longer held water in the light of these 
developments35 Different metaphors such as a "cobweb,,36 of relations were used to depict the 
intercollilectedness of actors from different corners of the globe. 
34 Leon, T. "South Afri ca mllst pump diplomatic iron before taking the world on its shoulders", The Sunday 
Independent, March 18, 200 I, p. 7. 
" Wolfers. A. 1962. Discord and collaborations: Essays on International Politics. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, p. 19. 
36 Little, R. "The growing Relevance of Pluralism", in S. Smith et a1. 1996. Intemational Theory: Positivism and 
Beyond. Cambridge University Press: New York, p. 67. 
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These developments in international politics led to the emergence of pluralism. This led to a 
new debate between pluralists and state-centric perspectives. The former advanced a new set of 
assumptions about the state of international politics. Firstly, pluralists reject the state as a 
primary actor. They argue that non-state actors are important entities in international politics. 
International organisations are not just forums within which states compete, but on the contrary 
important agenda setting entities in international politicsl7 With the same strength 
multinational corporations were becoming a dominant feature of international politics. 
Pluralists believe that their ability to interfere with the authority of states means that they 
calIDot be dismissed. 
Secondly, pluralism argues that the state is not a unitary entity. It is rather an embodiment of 
competing individual groups, interests and bureaucracies38 They argue that to view the state as 
unitary is tantamount to "reification,,}9 It is in within this context that they see the dichotomy 
between domestic and international politics as breaking down. They argue that. " " .boundaries 
are dissolving and international politics is being domesticated,,40 
Thirdly, stemming from their conception of the state as being "pluralistic", they contest the 
rational actor notion put forward by realists. Their fragmented view of the state characterised 
by clash of interests, bargaining and compromise is not always conducive to rational decision-
37 Viott i, P & Kauppi, M. 1987. International Relations Theory: Realism, Pluralism, Globalism and Beyond. 
Macmillan Publ ishing Company, Inc: USA, p. 228. 
J8 Viotti , P & Kauppi , M. 1987. International Relations Theory: Realism, Pluralism. Globali sm and beyond, p.228 
39 For them when we ta lk of South African Foreign Policy we are referring to a product of competing perspectives, 
coali tion and compromise after whi ch a policy is announced in the name ofa country. See Viatti, P & Kauppi , M, 
p.229. 
40 Smith, S., Booth, K & Zalewski, M. 1996 International Theory: Positivism and Beyond. Cambridge University 
Press: New York, p. 66. 
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making. Misperceptions and bureaucratic politics can lead to poor calculations, hence irrational 
Fourthly, the broad agenda of intemational politics demonstrates that state-centricism and 
national security Issues touted by state-centric perspective no longer define international 
politics. An interdependent world has spawned economic, social and ecological issues that are 
also equally important in intemational politics. Luard discusses these non-military issues that 
are placed high on the international agenda such as environmental issues, pollution and 
refugees42 It is on these grounds that pluralists reject the high-low politics dichotomy. 
Put within the South African foreign policy debate, pluralism nuses some interesting 
interpretations. Pluralists argue that South Africa is superimposed on an international system of 
states as well as non-state actors43 International politics is much more complex than explained 
by both political structuralists and realists. The pluralistic nature of the international system 
makes it difficult for South Africa to gather the information needed for purposes of foreign 
policy formulation. This means that the exercise of foreign policy is not as easy as depicted by 
the rational actor conception put forward by realists. The ambiguities in South African foreign 
policy can thus be explained in the context of an unpredictable and complex web of relations 
between states and non-state actors. 
41 Viotti , P. Kauppi , M. 1987. International Relations Theory: Realism, Pluralism, Globalism and Beyond. p. 230 
42 Luard, E. 1990. Globalisation of Politics: The Changed Focus of Political Action in The Modem World. 
Macmillan: London . 
43 According to pluralists, " the international system is one of mixed actors", See Evans, G & Newnham. J. i 998. 
Pen gui n Dictionary of Intemational Relations. Penguin Books: USA, p. 438. 
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Pluralists reject the unitary view of the state put forward by realists44 . Within borders of states 
there exist competing groups such as interest groups and political parties. The process of policy 
making is an exercise that involves the diverse interests of a pluralistic society. The distinction 
between domestic and international politics is also dislodged. South Africa's international 
politics is the extension of its domestic politics4s . A complete analysis of South African foreign 
policy requires an analysis of interactions between various entities that influence foreign 
policy. The enatic nature of South Africa foreign policy is thus a product of competition, 
coalitions and compromises that have to be made in an attempt to maintain a balance between 
different interests46 Any foreign policy that embodies interests of diverse groups is bound to 
have occasional contradictions and ambiguities47 • 
One of the pertinent assumptions put forward by pluralists is that of the extensive nature of the 
international agenda. The end of the Cold War changed the international conjuncture to include 
new issue areas48 Social issues such as pollution, environmental degradation, poverty and 
natural disasters occupy a top priority in international relations49 By the same token, economic 
issues such as international trade and competition between blocs have also gained new 
momentum. This means that international affairs have become much more complex. South 
44 Little, R. "The growing relevance of pluralism", in Smith, S., Booth, K & Zalewski, M. 1996. International 
Theory: Pos itivism and Beyond. Cambridge University Press: New York, p. 2. 
" Viotti , P & Kauppi , M. 1987. International Relations Theory: Realism. Pluralism, Globalism and Beyond. 
Macmillan Publishing Company, IncJ: USA, p. 232. 
46 Maintain ing a balance between interests of opposition parties such as Democratic Alliance and the UDM is not an 
easy process, especially when coupled with interests and aspirations of the leading party's electorate . 
.07 South Africa is a diverse nation consisting of the poor rural masses, th e black middle class, the Afrikaaner 
minority and numerous other groupings whose interests have to be priOIitiscd 111 foreign policy. 
-18 Talking abollt thi s new post Cold War environ ment Naidoo argues that the intemational system was forced to 
reth ink traditional notions such as national security. See Naidoo, S. 1997. New Rules for Security and Survival: 
Southem Africa's Adaptation to A Changing World Environment. Rhodes University MA Thesis: South Africa, p. 
3. 
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Africa might be concerned with environmental issues for instance, but because some other 
issue such as industrialisation have become urgent, environmental issues might be given 
secondary importance. In sunmlary, the international agenda is so extensive such that it is 
difficult to simultaneously give equal priority to all foreign policy goals. Contradictions are 
thus a product of the complex nature of international issues and the intertwined nature of 
relations between states and non-state actors. 
2.6 A conceptual evaluation of the theoretical debates 
Realism offers some insightful explanations of international relations. It does not however, 
place emphasis on non-state actors and non-military issues that have become pertinent in 
international relations. Their preoccupation with high politics negates the increasing 
permeability of state borders by multinational corporations and other non-state entities such as 
drug syndicate groupsso The growing importance of non-state entities and relevance of issues 
such as poverty, migration and global economic decline that are not confined within state 
borders cannot be dismissed. Realism falls short of explaining these equally important areas of 
international relations. Furthermore, the importance of internal political processes on foreign 
,. Luard, E. 1990. Glob.lis.tion of Politics: The Changed Focus of Political Action in the Modem World. 
Macmillan: London. 
50 Despite the fact that realism has offered a window through which international politics can be analysed, it is too 
rigid and understates the Tole of non-state entities slich as terrorists groups whose actions affect the course of 
intemational events. The recent alleged involvement of a terrorist group AI Qaeda in the terrOlist attacks 011 the 
Pentagon and World Trade Centre in the US are indicative afnoll -state actors' resounding influence in international 
affairs. On the rigidity of realism and its inabil ity to capture events li ke thi s see Evans, G & Newnham, J. 1998. 
Penguin Dictionary of lntemational Politics. Penguin Books: USA, p. 466. 
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policies of states is also a crucial area which realism dismisses by creating a distinction 
between domestic and international realms. 
The domestic aspect of South Africa's foreign policy is crucial in the analysis of South 
Africa's conduct towards the rest of the world. South Africa has shown through commitment 
and deed that it desires to relate with other states in a non-discriminatory manner. This is one 
of the values entrenched in its domestic policies51 . The role of individuals and domestic interest 
groups seeking to influence government policy in general cannot be underestimated. The role 
of organised labour, the media and robust civil society52 characterise South Africa's foreign 
policy since 1994. This aspect playing a pertinent role in international relation is not 
thoroughly conceptualised by realism. 
Pluralism does account for change in the form of burgeoning political economic and social 
transactions5J They view the nation state as being eclipsed by non-territorial actors such as 
multinational corporations54 Their criticism of realism raises interesting conceptual 
limitations. However, they do not seem to offer any clear framework within which 
international politics can be conceptualised other than criticising their opponents' assurnptions. 
51 South Africa befriends pariah states due to the commitment to diplomatic engagement and eschews olltJight 
condemnation and marginaii sation of other states. This is the behaviour associated with middle powers in their 
attempt to playa conciliatory role in internation al affairs. See Cooper, F. 1997. Niche Diplomacy: Middle powers 
after the Cold War. Macmillan: London. 
52 With the shift of power from states to non~state actors , such as nongovernmental organizations. community 
organizations, neighborhood associations, religious organizations, professional associations, not-for-profit private 
corporat ions, membership organizations, and all forms of private organizations and institutions are now more 
influential in policy making. See a speech made to the UN Symposium on Outreach to Civil Society by the Director 
ofGovel11ance and Civil Society ofFord Foundation (Imp:. \vww.wfuna.orgtsitt: Edwards speech ttl SYmpusium .hlm) 
53 Keohane, R & Nye J. 1989. Power and Interdependence. Harper Collins: USA (pp. 3) 
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This thesis does not intend to give credit too one school of thought and dismiss the other as that 
would be tantamount to arguing that international politics of the late 20th century is completely 
different from that of today. The international system is "marked by both continuity and 
change,,55 No single school of thought can wholly capture the picture without blending its 
assumptions with those of other schools of thought in international relations56 
Pluralism is useful in the understanding of South Africa 's foreign policy. It raises the 
plW"alistic aspect of a country and captures the essence of its politics. However, their analysis 
downplays the role of the state and gives primacy to non-state actors. It does not illuminate the 
structural limitations imposed on these non-state actors by the international system. For 
example, in South Africa the labour movement nnder the banner of Congress of South Aft'ican 
Trade Unions (COSATU) was opposed to the governments Growth, Employment and 
Redistribution (GEAR) policy. They viewed this macro-economic policy as aimed at opening 
the economy to market forces , thus delaying the issue of redistribution and equality57 
However, due to the fact that the government had to respond to issues of economic growth and 
attraction of foreign direct investment (FDI) this discontent by the labour movement did not 
yield much. Instead it led to rifts between African National Congress (ANC), South African 
Communist Party (SACP) and COSATU alliance. Another example is that of COSATU's 
54 Keohane and Nye. 1989. Power and Interdependence. Harper Collins: USA. 
55 Keohane, Rand Nye, J. Power and Interdependence. Harper Collins: USA, p. 4. 
S6 Keohane and Nye argue that international relations is not seamless, but a tapestry of diverse relations and no one 
theory call capture it. See Keohane, R and Nyc, 1. Power and Interdependence. Harper Collins: USA, p. 4. Also see 
Kegley, C, Herman , C. and Rosenau, J. 1987. New Di rections in the study of foreign policy. Allen & Unwin 
Publi shers: USA . 
57 See Lehloesa, T. 2000. South Africa's Growth Employment and Redistribution Strategy in the Context of 
Structural Adjustment Programmes in the South. Rhodes University MA Thesis, p. 6. 
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support of the trade union federation (SFTU) against the Swazi government in 199758 This 
solidarity by COSATU did not have much influence on South Africa 's foreign policy towards 
Swaziland regarding democratic reforms, This means that domestic civil society is important, 
but to presume that it plays a dominant role in foreign policy and government policy in general 
is tantamow1t to arguing that the government policy is entirely driven by domestic 
considerations. There is a degree of incompatibility between domestic affairs and international 
affairs. Plmalism seems to give too much attention to domestic processes. If there were a 
simple continuity between the two, South Africa would not be required to consider 
international trends in formulating its policies59 
Political structmalism offers a more plausible analysis of South African foreign policy. Due to 
its experience in overcoming apartheid and establishing democracy, South Africa is being 
perceived as more inclined towards championing human rights and democratisation60 This 
concenh'ation on what South Africa can provide, in an international system of cooperation 
between diverse actors, is common amongst pluralists. It understates the fact that South Africa 
also has to contend with restraints imposed on it by the political and economic structme of the 
international system. South Africa's foreign policy values have to be reconciled with a 
complex natme of international affairs. Political structuralism directs attention to this aspect of 
international relations, which sets the parameters of state behaviour. South Africa's disposition 
SR Mutume, G. uThe struggle for democracy in Swaziland continues", in Mail & Guardian, February 7, 1997. 
59 More often than not South Africa is compelled to fine-tunc its domestic policies slich that they are in line with 
intemational trends (sometimes against the wi ll of South Aflicans). Adoption of GEAR despite dissatisfaction by the 
labour movement is a classic example of economic policy seeking to embrace a liberal global economic system. 
60 Pfister, R. 2000. South Africa's Recent Foreign Policy Towards Africa: Issues and Literature. Centre For 
International Studies: Zurich, p. 3. 
28 
towards issues of human rights, democracy, equality and development is not a sufficient 
indicator of actual foreign policy practice. This is due to the fact that the structural imperatives 
of the international system force it to act in a manner different to what it would have ordinarily 
done. 
Conceptualising international politics through the consideration of distribution of capabilities is 
another relevant factor in the analysis provided by political structuralism. South Africa lacks 
the resource potential necessary for the alleviation of socio-economic problems at home, let 
alone in other parts of the continent. Due to this relatively weak resource potential, South 
Africa is forced to prioritise its foreign policy goals such that they are in line with its position 
in the international system. South Africa has been accused of pursuing grand foreign policy 
goals, which it does not have the resources to accomplish, instead of clear foreign policy 
commitments closer to home61 . South Africa's inability to implement its ambitious foreign 
policy goals due to lack of resources is explained most adequately by political structuralism's 
.... . notion of unequal distribution of capabilities amongst states in the intemational system,,62 
2.7 Conclusion 
Political stmcturalism remains relevant in analysing South African foreign policy. It provides 
us with an analytical tool that does 110t preoccupy itself with the impact South Africa can have 
(; 1 Leon, T. "South Africa must pump diplomatic iron before taking the world on its shoulders", The Sunday 
Independent, 18 March 2000, p 7. 
62 Evans. G. & Newnham, J. 1998. Penguin Dictionary of International Relations. Penguin Books: London. 
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on the intelllational system. On the contrary, it allows foreign policy analysts and makers alike 
to assess the limitations imposed on South Africa by the intelllational system. It would be 
negligent of any foreign policy maker to ignore the stmctural challenges imposed on a 
cowltry's resources by virtue of being part of an intelllational system. A view of foreign policy 
that takes cognisance of systemic constraints is indispensable. Firstly, it will enable South 
African foreign policy makers to prioritise foreign policy goals more realistically. Secondly, it 
enables foreign policy analysts to capture the limitations of South African foreign policy 
missions. Thirdly, South Africa can only close the gap between foreign policy "theory and 
practice,,63 if it sets itself goals within its reach rather than broad goals for which resources are 
required. 
6) Pfi ster, R. 2000. South Africa's Foreign Policy Towards Africa: Issues and Literature. CIS: Zurich, p. 12. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
A THEORETICAL CONCEPTION OF THE AMBIGUITY BETWEEN 
FOREIGN POLICY AND FOREIGN POLICY BEHAVIOUR AFTER 1994 
3.1 Introduction 
After the adoption of a constitutional democracy in 1994, South Africa formed the 
Government of National Unit (GNU( At an international level its pariah status was 
discarded and it took its rightful place in international affairs. Its policies and 
programmes began focussing not only on internal issues, but showed an international 
dimension. Countries around the world extended diplomatic recognition and some began 
forging new partnerships to assist in the rebuilding of wh·at had been a society shattered 
by the system of apartheid2 South Africa demonstrated a desire to conduct its foreign 
relations in a manner that espoused democratic values. Human rights, the promotion of 
democracy, respect for international law, forging of economic ties with the world and 
reflection of Africa's interests, all formed the linchpins of South African foreign polici. 
All these developments in foreign policy signalled the role South Africa was going to 
play in international affairs. 
I ANC " Foreign Policy Perspective in a democratic South Africa" ANC Foreign Policy Document, 
December 1994, p. I 
2 South Africa's embassies increased throughout the world with the assumption ofa constitutional 
democracy. It also retllmed to the Commonwealth, United Nations, joined SADC and the Organisation for 
Africa Unity (OAU). See Nel, P., Taylor, I & Van de Westhuizen, J. "Multilateralism in SOllth Africa 's 
Foreign Policy: The Search for a Critical Rationale", A paper presented at the yd Pan-European Conference 
on Intemational Relations, Vienna, 19-19 September, 1998, p. 7. 
3 ANC, "Foreign Policy Perspecti ve in a democratic South Africa", an ANC document archived at 
gQpI~_~E:~~gopher.~~ . org.~/OOGm£~Q.Q.!i~y~foreig£l~ 
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However, despite the fact that the Cold War was over and apartheid had reached its 
demise in South Africa, maintaining coherence between foreign policy theory and 
practice remained a vexing challenge. The international conjuncture had changed in a 
manner that was conducive to the pursuit of foreign policy sensitive to liberal ideals on 
the one hand. On the other hand it re-imposed a combination of old and new limitations 
on what states could or could not achieve4 In the case of South Africa, commentators 
talked of a South Africa that acted in a manner incongruent with the noble ideals 
contained in its foreign policy documents5 Despite its stated will to playa preponderant 
role in bringing about lasting solutions to human problems through promotion of 
democracy there exists a gap between discourse and practice6 Debates in South Africa 
suggest that the enthusiasm that accompanied the opening of relations after 1994 showed 
signs of being unrealistic as early as 19957 
This chapter examines the gap between liberal values mirrored in South Africa's foreign 
policy and the actual foreign policy behaviour. Firstly, it commences by outlining the 
changing manner in which South Africa projects its democratic political culture in its 
relations with the world8 Secondly, an assessment of South Africa's foreign policy vis-a-
4 Even though the end of the Cold War led to the termination of conflicts, new ones emerged militating 
against the prevalence of peaceful relations between actors in international politics. 
5 Suttner, R. "South African Foreign Policy and the Promotion of Human Rights", in FGD Occasional 
Paper No. "Through A Glass Darkly? Human Rights Promotion in South African Foreign Policy", 13 
August 1996.p. 16. 
6 Pfister, R. 2000. " South Africa 's Recent Foreign Policy Towards Africa: Issues and Literature". CIS 
Publication: Zurich, p. 12 
7 "South Africa's fe-entry into the global arena has not been problem-free", See Aj ulu, R. "South Afri ca 
and the North/South: Pragmatism versus Principle", in C. Landsberg" G. Le Pere and Van Nieuwkerk, A. 
1995. Mission Imperfect: Redirecting South ACTica's Foreign Policy. Foundation for Global Dialogue: 
Johannesburg, p. 45. 
S South Africa's foreign policy was initially predicated on a desire to promote progressive liberal 
democratic values. As it got more deeply involved in international affairs it began realising that pursuing a 
morally charged foreign policy was not easy as it was initially thought it would be. 
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VIS foreign policy behaviour is undertaken. Here the extent to which foreign policy 
behaviour has been an antithesis of what is reflected in foreign policy documents and 
speeches by foreign ministers is examined. Furthermore, an explanation and outline of 
the imperatives of the international system that thwart South Africa's good foreign policy 
intentions is offered. The objectives of this section are to reflect that countries such as 
South Africa face not only opportunities, but also challenges that are brought about by 
virtue of being part of the international system. It is through an understanding of the 
nature and magnitude of these challenges that South Africa will be able to put in place 
more realistic and practically achievable foreign policy objectives. Attention is drawn to 
the limitations imposed on South Africa's foreign policy by an international system that 
is globalising, grossly unequal and with geo-economic considerations as its Leitmotif. 
As a concluding remark it is suggested that such an international system sometimes 
compels South Africa to sacrifice its noble ideals in favour of pragmatism and 
refornlism lo 
9 Globalisatiol1 has brought economics to the healt of intemational relations leading to the reinsertion of 
states into the intemational system that is characterised by gains and losses. South Africa is not an 
exception in that its position in the international political and economic system dictates that it can do some 
things with considerable degree of success while it can dismally fail in others. This is the price it pays in its 
foreign policy. 
10 This is the lenn utilised by Taylor and Nel in an attempt to show that South Africa is sometimes 
compelled to adopt a soft approach against issues it would have otherwise vigorously condemned. See Nel, 
P & Taylor, I. "Multilateralism in South Africa's Foreign Policy: The Search for A Critical Rationale", A 
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3.2 The liberal content of South Africa's foreign policy 
It is necessary to establish the principles underpinning South Africa's foreign policy 
before examining the lack of consistency between stated foreign policy goals and foreign 
policy behaviour 1 I. The most prominent problems regarding South Africa's foreign 
policy can only be identified after a careful analysis of the good intentions underpinning 
it has been carried out. The transition to democracy and the subsequent rise of non-racial 
South Africa led to the reorientation of the country's national policies. The constitution 
adopted in 1996 makes reference to universal moral values such as equality for all, 
respect for human rights, creation of a just and equitable society and respect for law l2 . 
These liberal values were not only confined to the realm of domestic policy. They have 
also been articulated with the same spirit and vociferousness in South Africa's foreign 
relations i3 . Even before the adoption of the constitution in 1996 South Africa 
preoccupied itself with the "promotion of human rights in its international relations" 14 
since the inception of democracy in 1994. As a matter of course, South Africa declared 
its intention to participate and promote human rights in multilateral fora such as the Third 
World Committee of the United Nations General Assembly and the Commission on 
paper presented at the yd Pan-European Conference on International Relations, Vienna, 16-19 September, 
1998, p. I I. 
11 Henwood, R. "South Africa's Foreign Policy: Principles and Problems", Published Monograph, No 13 
Fairy Godmother, Hegemon or Partner? May 1997. 
12 Chapter 2, sections 9 and 10 make reference to equality before the law and human dignity for all South 
African citizens respectively. See Constitution of the Republic of South Africa. 
(http ://www.polity.org.zalgovdocs/constitu tion/saconst.html). 
D Domestic and Foreign Policies are tightly intertwined. However what remains to be established is the 
degree to which different countries succeed in promoting their internal values globally. See Schrire, R. & 
Silke, D. "Foreign Policy: The Domestic Context", in M. Muller and W. Carlsnaes 1997. Change and South 
Africa's Extemal Relations. ITP: SA, p. 3. 
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Human Rights l 5 Since 1994 South Africa has actively participated in international 
regimes with a view to promoting the issue of human rights. The accession to the African 
Charter on Human Rights in July 1996 was also an indication of the priority given to 
universal moral and humanitarian issues. As part of its inclination towards the protection 
of human rights it began speaking against countries with gross human right violations. As 
such, South Africa began involving itself on the issue of human rights as early as 1994 
when Mandela visited Nigeria to urge the Abacha regime to move towards democracy. 
The country's involvement in this issue did not culminate with this soft approach. South 
Africa's High Conunissioner in Nigeria was recalled and South Africa called for the 
suspension of Nigeria from the Commonwealth l6 . 
Issues of human rights can be effectively pursued in an environment that is conducive to 
democracy. The promotion of human rights is incomplete without the existence of 
democratic institutions. It is in this context that South Africa has played a "catalytic 17" 
role in the promotion of democracy in other parts of the world. South Africa's 
commitment to the resolution of conflicts through peaceful means throughout the world 
was demonstrated when it sent a delegation to assist in the Northern Ireland peace 
process. It also made a contribution in an attempt to peacefully resolve the political crisis 
14 Mandela, N. 1993. "South Africa's Future Foreign Policy", Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, No.5, 
November/December 1993. 
IS Muller, M. "CulTent Developments in South African Foreign Policy", in Modem Diplomacy. A 
collection of papers presented at the MeditctTanean Academy of Diplomacy, February 1998. 
16 Seymour, V ... Global Dialogue, Human Rights and Foreign Policy: Wi ll SO llth Africa Please Lead?", in 
Southern Africa Perspecrives, No. 55, 1996. Cape Town., p. 5. South Africa also sent Archbishop Desmond 
Tutu to express conccm over the state of human tights in the Nigeria, but to no avail. Mandela cliticised 
Nigclia in 1995 for the executions of Ken Saro Wiwa and other Ogeni activists. 
17 Le Pere, G. , Lambrechts, K. & van Nieuwkerk, A. "South Aftica's foreign poli cy challenges in the new 
millennium", in Global Dialogue, Vol. 4.3, December 1999, p. 2. 
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in East Timor l 8 Pretoria's involvement in the peace process in Burundi is also indicative 
of South Africa's desire to contribute to peaceful resolution of conflict and establishment 
of democratic institutions, which will in turn ensure that human rights violations come to 
South Africa got involved in other areas that are also inextricably linked to human rights, 
thus taking its mission of promoting democratic values externally even further. It realised 
that it is impossible to facilitate peace in a world where states continue to ann 
themselves. It started to play an active role in the issue of disannament with a view to 
creating an environment conducive to peaceful resolution of disputes. As part of its 
commitment to peace South Africa became very instrumental in the 1995 signing of the 
indefinite extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)2o 
This predisposition occurred in tandem with the domestic political process of democratic 
consolidation. It was a natural outgrowth of its domestic moral stance. South Africa 's 
commitment to liberal democratic values was put fOlward with the same vigour as the 
ANC's statement on foreign policy, which indicated that, "South Africa will not be 
selective and afraid in raising the issue of human rights violations,,21 . TIns course of 
action from South Africa created a perception that it would not sacrifice the principles 
enshrined in its foreign policy documents in favour of economic and political expediency. 
18 Mills, G. 2000. The Wired Model: South Africa, Foreign Policy and Globalisation. SAIIA & Tafelburg: 
South Africa, p. 264. 
!9 Gough, D. uMandela hits out at Burundi's warring leaders", in Mai l & Guardian, 17 January 200. 
20 Seymour. V. "Global Dialogue, human Rights and Foreign Policy: Wi ll South Africa please lead'!" in 
Southelll Africa Perspectives, No. 55, 1996. Cape Town, p. 2. 
21 ANC, 1993. Foreign Policy Perspective in a democratic South Africa, p. I. 
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South Africa also showed a holistic approach in its desire to promote democratic 
principles externally. It based its relations with Southern Africa and Africa on the liberal 
principles of democracy. In its approach to regionalism within SADC for instance, South 
Africa advocates for an integration process predicated on democratic values rather than 
on militaristic approach22 . Inside South Africa the consolidation of democracy has been 
pursued concurrently with economic empowerment and creation of an equitable society. 
This approach emanated from a realisation that democracy is intangible and will have no 
meaning if the lives of South Africans are not directly improved. It is in this context that 
as early as 1994 the government introduced a Reconstruction and Development 
Progranll1e (RDP)D In its relations with Southern Africa, South Africa operates within 
this perspective of ensuring that democracy is augmented by economic development. It is 
reflected in the foreign policy discourse that South Africa is committed to the 
development of Southern Africa. This is done with a view to laying a foundation 
conducive to the pursuit of democratic values of human rights, peace and equity24. 
Africa is also placed at the top of the progressive agenda emanating from South Africa's 
internal disposition towards liberal principles. In the immediate aftermath of the 1994 
22 Venter, D. "South Africa's foreign poli cy in a time of change: The African Dimension", in Journal of tile 
Third World Spectrum 5, No.2, Fall 1998, p. 2. 
23 RDP was a government-initiated programme aimed at de~eloping the country's human resources so that 
they contribute to the fe-building of South Africa. It was a bottom-up approach in that the community 
played a vital role in deciding what measures had to be taken in meeting their needs. By the same token 
South Africa sought to involve Southern Africans in an amicable way in the fe-building of a sub-region that 
had once been devastated by South Africa's apartheid state. On the definition of RDP see Lehloesa, T. 
South Aliica's Growth and Redistribution Strategy in the context of Structural Adjustment Programmes. 
Rhodes University MA Thesis: South Africa, p 9. 
24 ANC, 1993. Foreign Policy Perspective in A Democratic South Africa. ANC foreign policy document, 
December 1994. 
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elections South Africa joined the Organisation of African Unity (OAU)25. It did so with 
the objective of promoting human rights, democratic consolidation and peaceful 
resolution of conflict that afflicts Africa. Its foreign policy approach to Africa is that 
which seeks to transform Africa into an entity that is free, peaceful and vibrant26 . It is in 
this context that South Africa's foreign policy with respect to Africa is centred on a 
desire to promote an African renaissance. Africa is seen as a victim of an unequal global 
economic and political system. Given its domestic policies and belief in equality South 
Africa seeks to combat global inequality that continues not only to marginalise Africa, 
but which also makes the promotion of democracy impossible. 
South Africa's commitment to liberal democratic principles is being thwarted by the 
realities of the foreign policy environment within which it operates. The initial position of 
participating in the promotion of democracies in Africa and across the world has become 
too idealistic due to the lack of suitable foreign policy environment both in Africa and in 
the international system in general. In the context of Africa the promotion of liberal 
values is constrained by a need for economic development, without which democratic 
principles become meaningless. This has led to a South African foreign policy that seems 
to pay lip service to the promotion of democracy while preoccupying itself with an 
agenda that prioritises economic issues over liberal principles. This has created an 
2S The OAU was transfOllned into an African Union at two-day extraordinary meeting of the Organisation 
of African Unity (OAU) held in Sirte, Libya. See Mail & Guardian, "Death ofOAU Birth of AU", 27 May 
2001. 
26 ANC, 1993. "Foreign Policy Perspective in a Democratic South Africa", ANC foreign policy document, 
December 1994. 
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impression that South Africa ' s foreign policy is ambiguous in that it rhetorically asserts 
liberal principles while it is geared towards wealth creation27• 
The international system also imposes limitations on South African foreign policy. South 
Africa is new in international politics and is in the process of finding its feet in a complex 
international political economy dominated by the rich. South Africa's geographic 
location in the world's least developed continent compels it to preoccupy itself with 
issues of economic development at the expense of a progressive agenda adopted soon 
after 1994. It is argued here that this ambiguity between foreign policy and foreign policy 
behayiour is thus not of South Africa's own making, but a product of foreign policy 
environment within which South Africa operates. At this juncture we undertake to 
scrutinise the ambiguities of South Africa foreign policy with a view to evaluating and 
offering a convincing account of South African foreign policy problems as it gradually 
becomes part of the international system. 
3.3 Explaining the inconsistencies ill South African foreign policy behaviour 
The international foreign policy environment within which South Africa operates does 
not always allow for the implementation of South Africa's foreign policy goals. It is the 
restraints imposed on South Africa by the political and economic structure of the 
27 The ambiguity in South African foreign policy is clearer when the Mandela foreign policy committed to 
democracy. peace and respect for law is compared with the emerging foreign policy doctrine of an African 
Renaissance. This emerging doctrine departs from pure preoccupation with liberal principles to include 
issues of economic development. See Landsberg, C & Hlophe, D. "The African Renaissance as a modem 
South Africa foreign policy strategy", Centre for International Studies and Research publication, October 
1999. 
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international system that lead to it proclaiming liberal values that it cannot practically 
implement. The international system of the 1990s was characterised by changes that gave 
both space and limitations on what countries can achieve. On the one hand, it has brought 
about democratisation in many parts of the world such as Africa28 On the other hand, the 
international system has been restructured in a manner that has deepened the North-South 
divide restraining those at the receiving end of a glob ali sing world from having a 
meaningful voice. Situated in the developing world, struggling to deliver to its electorate 
and to consolidate democracy at home, the restraints imposed on South Africa by the 
international foreign policy environment weigh more heavily. 
The changes of the 1990s heralded in an environment in which international events were 
no longer defined by state boundaries. But the manner in which the international political 
and economic system has been restructured seems to impose limitations on states. The 
end of conflict between forces of capitalism and communism and demise of apartheid in 
South Africa brought about euphoria. However, the post Cold War- post-Apartheid order 
seems to have brought new constraints that thwart attempts by South Africa to export 
democracy, good governance and the human rights culture. South Africa's foreign policy 
discourse is such that it gives the impression that South Africa will speak out and 
condemn human rights abuses. However, South Africa's initial attempt to extend liberal 
values, entrenched in its domestic policies, to its foreign policy has not been successful. 
In practice there has been a contradiction between the stated foreign policy goals and 
" Ajulu, R. 1995. "South Afi·ica and the North/South: Pragmatism versus Principle", in Landsberg, C, Ie 
Pere, G, van Nieuwkerk, A. Mission Imperfect: Redirecting South Africa's Foreign Policy. Foundation for 
Global Dialogue and Centre for Policy Studies: Johannesburg, p 46 
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foreign policy behaviour29 A nnmber of criticisms have been advanced against the 
inherent contradictions in South Africa's foreign policy. 
On the issue of human rights opposition parties argue that South Africa lacks coherent 
foreign policy. It is also argued that a number of incidents demonstrate that South Africa 
has only made a general commitment to human rights . It lacks specific methods to speak 
against and combat human rights abuses30 Joining the international system has proven 
not to be as easy as most South Africans thought it would be at the demise of apartheid. 
The excitement of 1994 seems to have underestimated the limitations imposed on South 
Africa's will to navigate for itself an international role that is consistent with its internal 
democratic disposition. 
Before South Africa can succeed in finding a meaningful role in the international system, 
the ambiguities inherent in its foreign policy behaviour have to be conceptualised. It is 
through the understanding of the factors restraining it from acting consistently that a 
coherent foreign policy can be formulated. Even though the current analysis offers an 
insight into foreign policy problems, a more theoretical understanding is required. A 
broad analysis put forward by scholars like Ajulu and Davies is more appealing and 
consistent with the goal of this research. According to Ajulu the explanation for the lack 
29 Williams, P "South African Foreign Policy: Getting Critical?" Politikon (2000), 27 (I), p. 88. Nkuhlu 
pro\· ides another interesting account on blunders of our foreign policy. See Nkuhlu, C. 1995. "South Africa 
and the North/South: Pragmatism versus Principle". Chlis Landsberg, Garth Ie Pere and Anthoni van 
Nieuwkerk, Mission lmperfect: Redirecting South Africa!s Foreign Policy. Johannesburg: Foundation for 
Global Dialogue and Centre for Policy Studies, p 53-58 
30 Bosman, J. "SA Govell1ment Applying Double Standards. Human Rights Only Applicable to South 
Africans", Media Release by Federal Alliance, 8th December 1999. On the ambiguity characterising South 
Africa Foreign Poli cy also see Ryall , D. "Caught between two worlds: Understanding South Africa's 
Foreign Policy Options", Third World Quarterly, Vol. 18, No . 2, 1997, p. 397 
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of direction in South Africa's foreign policy lies in the "complex international terrain and 
limitations it imposes on South Africa,,31. Davies also argues that due to constraints in the 
international system, "not all foreign policy opportunities that became apparent with the 
end of apartheid can be easily exploited,,32. 
The one aspect of foreign policy in which South Africa behaves in a manner inconsistent 
with its foreign policy goals has been the area of human rights. In this context, South 
Africa has been unable to coordinate its trade policy in arms in a manner that reflects on 
its commitment to human rights. South Africa sought to adhere to the alms trade criteria, 
set by the National Conventional Arms Control Committee (NCACC), not to sell to 
regions at war33 South Africa has adhered to this policy on arms trade in the transfer of 
an11S to some parts of the world. What remains a problem is the fact that it has not been in 
a position to synchronise this policy with its position on issues of human rights and 
peace. Despite the restrictive nature of the policy on arms trade, it has not been applied 
consistently. Arms have been transferred to countries in conflict such as Angola, the 
Republic of Congo (Brazzaville) , India, Pakistan, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia and UgandaJ4 
This has created a perception that the country's trade policy on arms is incoherent and is 
implemented in a manner that lacks harmony with South Africa 's commitment to human 
31 Ajulu, R. 1995. "South Africa and the North/South: Pragmatism versus Principle", in C. Landsberg, G. Ie 
Pere and A. van Nieuwkerk. In Mi ssion Imperfect Redirectin g South Africa's Foreign Policy_ Foundation 
for Global Dialogue, and Centre for Policy Studies: Johannesburg 
32 Davies, R. "South Africa's Economic Relations with Africa: Current Patterns and Future Perspectives", 
A. Adebayo. 1996. South Africa and Africa: Within or Apart, London and New Jersey: Zed Books, p. 167 
JJ Mills, G. 2000. The wired model. South Africa, foreign policy and globalisation. SAlIA & Tafelburg 
Publishers Limited: South Africa, pg 265 
34 Bondi, L. "A question ofplinciple: Arms trade and human rights", in Human Rights Watch Report, Vol. 
12, No. 5(A), October 2000 (www.hrw.org/rep0l1s/2000/salhca). Trade to such countries as Rwanda and 
Uganda is likely to escalate regional instability and is against the Policy on Arms Trade restriction of 
avoiding transfer of anTIS where it would contribute to violation of human rights and violation of 
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rights. In a nutshell there is a need to coordinate the policy on the sale of anns in manner 
that reflects on the country's foreign policy commitments to human rights, democracy, 
peace and peace building35 
The arms industry is a lucrative aspect of South Africa's economy. South Africa is 
compelled to make hard choices between preaching liberal principles and pursuing its 
national economic interest. It seems the international system is such that if South Africa 
were to adhere to its plincipies at the expense of arms trade it will forego much needed 
revenue36 its economic position will be weaker rendering it incapable of playing a 
meaningful role in the renewal of Africa let alone in international affairs. The 
international system is such that there is a conflict between South Africa's foreign policy 
principles and the economic imperatives. It is because of this problematic reality that 
South Africa behaves inconsistently. 
Despite the stated commitment to the cause of human rights, Sonth Africa has also been 
unable to out rightly condenm and distance hun1an rights abusers. Some figures that have 
appalling human rights records have been welcomed and afforded safe haven in the 
counhy One such case has been that of an infamous Ethiopian dictator Mengistu Haile 
Mariam who was given medical treatment in South Africa. Despite demands by 
fundamental freedoms. See Chapter 6 of the White Paper on the South African Defence Related Industries 
C . ' j j •• :.:i'lli" j,1r!:" i. ~i .,' , 
35 South Africa's arms trade should be carried out in a manner that shows commitment to human rights and 
creation of a peaceful world. See 100. "South Africa's foreign policy mood: Moral intemationalism or 
Commercial Realism?" Global Dialogue, Vol. 3.1 March, 1998. 
36 South Africa seems to be in a moral dilemma as anns trade allows for economies of scale and creates 
employment. See Richard Meares, "The Moral Dilemma ofFrankenstein tl , Business Rep0l1, 3 September 
1997 and Shelton, O. "South Africa's Anns Industry. EXP011s wi ll determine the future", in Global 
Dialogue, Vol. 4.2 August 1999. 
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Ethiopians for his extradition South Africa chose to keep him in the countri7 In this 
case the principles underpinning foreign policy were compromised in favour of an old 
friend who gave support to the ANC under apartheid. It seems that South Africa has 
difficulties in harmonising its moral principles with a need to keep relations with old 
friends. Its foreign policy after 1994 is not entirely defined and informed by the liberal 
principles. It is also driven by imperatives of the international system that have defined 
friends and enemies38. It is against this background that the South African government 
has been accused of giving in to political reasons rather than the values it seeks to 
promote externally and upon which it is founded. 
The other important area in which South Africa has been criticised and which can be 
explained within the context of the hypothesis adopted here is that of conflict resolution 
in Africa. South Africa has played a crucial role in the resolution of conflicts in Africa 
and the implementation of ceasefire agreements. It has been instrumental in the Lusaka 
peace initiatives creating a framework within which crises can be resolved39 South 
Africa has also been active in facilitating the negotiated settlements in Angola, Zaire, the 
DRC, Mozambique, the Comoros and Burndi40 In all these examples, South Africa has 
been informed by its desire to play the role of a mediator seeking to end conflicts 
37 World Tibet Network, "South Africa divided by Foreign Policy of ANC", December 1999. 
38 The international system is such that South Aflica has to maintain relations with those who assisted in the 
struggle against apartheid and who still share common interests with it in a world divided between the 
North and the South. See Makoa, F. "South Africa's foreign policy towards the rest of Africa", in African 
Foreign Po licies in the 21 st Century. Working Papers compiled by Africa Institute: Pretoria, pAl . 
39 Ie Pere, G., Lambrechts, K. & van Nieuwkerk, A. " South Africa's foreign policy challenges in the new 
millennium", in Global Dialogue, Vol. 4.3, December 1999, p. 5. 4. See Bischoff, P-H. "Explaining Ambiguity? South Africa and the projection of pluralist middle power" , 
A paper presented at the 4!h Pan-European International Relations Conference, University of Kent, 
Canterbury (UK), 8- 10 September 2001, p. 14 
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amicably rather than through imposed conditions. It has been informed by its transition 
from apartheid to democracy, which was achieved through negotiations. 
South Africa's foreign policy in the area of peacekeeping and conflict resolution in 
Africa has its fai lures. Despite its catalytic role in the signing of ceasefires, the 
expectations that were created after 1994 have not been met. South Africa 's desire to play 
the role of a peacemaker that does not impose itself on others prevents it from having a 
substantive impact on conflict resolution. Its diplomatic approach during the 1998 
Congolese conflict fell far short of matching the stated commitment to African affairs. 
Given its commitment to amicable conflict resolution in Africa it was incumbent of South 
Africa not only to mediate in the conflict, but also to provide adequate material assistance 
for realisation of peace and stability. South Africa supported Kabila in 1997, but failed to 
act decisively against him when he undermined the democratic principles he flaunted 
when he was fighting against Mobutu. South Africa 's lack of direction in this regard 
reflected on South Africa's inability to operate in accordance with its human rights 
principles. As a country that is inextricably linked to Africa, South Africa has no choice 
but to make friends in the continent thus neutralising its morally charged foreign policy. 
The Zimbabwean crisis IS one other case in which South Africa's foreign policy 
principles have not been rigidly applied. South Africa's foreign policy stance towards 
Zimbabwe has been that of "quiet diplomacy" in that it has not been speaking out against 
human rights abuses conducted by Mugabe's Zanu-PF. This foreign policy approach has 
undermined South Africa' s commitment to liberal values. South Africa's stance towards 
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Zimbabwe could be understood in the context of limitations imposed on it by the foreign 
policy environment within which it operates. Zimbabwe is a Southern African country 
with which South Africa seeks to forge amicable economic and political ties. It is a 
realisation by South Africa that out right condemnation could endanger peaceful relations 
between these itself and Zimbabwe. This means that South Africa faces a challenge of 
striking a balance between being a unifying force in Africa and a custodian of liberal 
values. 
It seems South Africa has to do more than just facilitating transformation towards 
democracy and the signing of ceasefire agreements . More often than not, those involved 
in the conflict pay little attention to ceasefire initiatives, thus thwarting South Africa's 
attempt to involve itself in the amicable resolution of conflicts41. This has been a 
challenge facing South Africa's middle power inclination towards collective rather than a 
unilateral approach to resolving African conflicts. South Africa's caution not to impose 
itself on African countries and its neighbours makes its role in Africa weak. However, 
this soft approach creates an impression that South Africa is not committed to democratic 
values as it claims in its foreign policy discourse. South Africa is also committed to 
African Unity as demonstrated by its active role in projects such as African renaissance. 
The aspiration to create sol idarity necessary for African unity on the one hand and 
attraction of foreign direct investment on the other, is a contradictory one. It makes South 
41 South Africa is perceived by some as possessing the capacity to bring peace in Africa. However, others 
perceive it as a country that can imposes itself on others. This leads to South Africa adopting a cautious 
stance in Africa. It seems the African foreign policy environment also restra ins South Africa's foreign 
policy aspirations. See Bischoff, P-I-L "Explaining Ambiguity: South Afl;ca and the projection of plural ist 
middle power", A paper presented at the 41h Pan-European Intemational Relations Conference Uni vers ity of 
Kent, Canterbury (UK), 8-10 September 2001, p. 10. 
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Africa's foreign policy weak and incapable of consistently adhering to its stated goals in 
Africa and Southern Africa. What seems to be a foreign policy failure is a function of an 
envirolmlent wiiliin which foreign policy is exercised. 
Major inconsistencies in South Africa's foreign policy behaviour have also been in the 
area of economics. South Africa's middle power position makes it an ambiguous player 
in international affairs. On the one hand it seeks to have influence in the South, where it 
can form coalitions it needs to reform international institutions. On the other it is a middle 
power that can relate to Noriliern states where it also seeks to wield some influence in 
defining economic relations between iliese states and the South. As a country iliat has just 
emerged from decades of isolation there has also been a desire to get back onto ilie 
international stage, since 199442. South Africa's straddling4) position between Norili and 
South is epitomised in the adoption of, "liberal democratic reforms, deregulation, and 
privatisation,,44 which all open the country to Northern investment. This ambiguous 
position creates an impression that South Africa is not as committed as it was initially to 
Africa and its elevation from the margins of the global economy. It seems that South 
Africa pays only lip service by saying it sees itself as part of Africa. It is in this context 
that its commitment to an African development is perceived as a rhetorical device. 
42 Ryall, D. "Caught Between Two Worlds: Understanding South Africa's foreign policy options", in Third 
World Quarterly, Vol. 18, No.2, p. 400. 
43 This term is used by Hussein Solomon referring to South Africa's foreign policy that seeks to reconstruct 
Africa 011 the one hand and play embrace the N0l1h on the other. See Solomon, H. "South African foreign 
policy and middle power leadership", Fairy God Mother: Hegemon or Partner. ISS Monograph No. 13, 
May 1997. 
44 Ryall , D. "Caught Between Two Worlds: Understanding South Africa's foreign policy options", in Third 
World Qua.1erly, Vol. 18, No.2 , p. 402. Also see Bischoff, P-H. "Explaining Ambiguity: South Africa and 
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Furthennore, South Africa's democratic credentials make it an access point for Northem 
states seeking to invest in Africa. This also leads to a South Africa that is straddling 
between the North and South. Its position as a middle power that is capable of forging 
relations with Northem states leads to ambiguity emanating from the amalgamation of 
two different foreign policy environments. The challenge that this foreign policy 
environment imposes on South Africa is that of maintaining a balance between achieving 
economic growth by forging relations with the North while playing a major role in the 
upliftment of Southem states, particularly those in Africa45 
The lack of consistency between foreign policy and foreign policy behaviour can further 
be explained in the context of South Africa 's economic position. South Africa requires 
foreign direct investment from the North, while at the same time it seeks to uplift Africa. 
Its relative weak economic position vis-ii-vis the North requires it to forge relations and 
in the process attract investment for itself. The global economy is such that it is 
impossible for South Africa to enclose itself in a 'cocoon' if it is to hamess the benefits 
of the world economy, sometimes at the expense of its commitment to Africa46 
the projection of pluralist middle power", A paper presented at the 4'h Pan-European International Re lations 
Conference Uni versi ty of Kent, Canterbury (UK), 8-1 0 September 2001, p. 10. 
4S Ryall, D. "Caught Between Two Worlds: Understanding South Africa's foreign poli cy options", in Third 
World Quarterly , Vol. 18, No.2, p. 402. South Africa is caught between being an African or Southern state 
and middle power pursuing an influential economic posi tion in the g lobal economy. 
46 The North is the centre of wealth. which has to be kept as close as possible if South Africa and Africa are 
to gain economic benefits from them. See Bi schoff, P-H. Explaining Ambiguity: South Africa and the 
projection of plural ist middle power". A paper presented at the 41h Pan-European lntemational Re lations 
Conference University of Kent, Canterbury (UK), 8-10 September 2001 , p. 7. 
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The international system according to Bischoff continues to be the one characterised by 
permanent disorderliness in that states are still left to fend for themselves47 It can then 
be argued that the international state of affairs is such that the weak in the South are co-
opted in an international system dominated by the rich. South Africa finds itself squarely 
placed on such an international system in which it has to attract investment if it is to 
survive. In an international environment of this nature principles of human rights and 
democracy mirrored in South Africa's foreign policy conflict with its economic priorities. 
The lack of consistency in South Africa's foreign policy is thus a function of an 
intemational environment that forces the country to preoccupy itself with economic 
survival at the expense of principles that ought to underpin its foreign relations. 
Africa is also increasingly being politically and economically marginalised. The loss of 
strategic importance by the developing world, especially Africa seems to have intensified 
in the 1990s with the end of the Cold War48 International political events seem to be 
dominated by the most powerful states in the world such as the United States49 South 
Africa is compelled to preoccupy itself with strengthening its political and economic 
position in a world dominated by few rich countries of the North. In its attempts to playa 
meaningful role internationally it has to contend with forces that not only marginalise it, 
47 Bischoff, P. 1995. "Democratic South Africa and the world one year after: towards a new foreign policy. 
Centre for Southern African Studies: Bellville. 
48 African margin ality occurs against the backdrop of confl icts an d wars that have afflicted Africa since 
the immediate aftermath of independence. See Mills, G. 2000. The Wired Model: South Africa. foreign 
Policy and globalisation. SAIlA: Cape Town, p. 17. 
49 1ntemationai political events seem to gain weight only if they have the support of these major powers. 
America's refusal to accept some contents of the conference on Racism held in South Africa in September 
2001 and the subsequent setbacks thi s has had on the conference are indicative of the influence these states 
wield. 
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but that also thwart its foreign policy goals. Due to its limited influence, South Africa is 
prevented by the international foreign policy environment from effectively promoting 
democratic values globally. 
3.4 Foreign Policy Lessons for South Africa 
Post apartheid foreign policy emerged at a critical juncture in international relations. A 
juncture that not only supported the espousal of universal liberal values, but also of 
complex interdependence, unpredictability and harsh competition. This unmanageable 
foreign policy environment determines South Africa's foreign policy behaviour. For 
instance, South Africa aspires to take its place in international affairs and at the same 
time lead Africa 's renewal. It has to win friends in Africa and strike partnerships with 
countries of the North in order to generate wealth. The maintenance of a balance between 
principle and pragmatism has proven to be difficult. South Africa thus sh·addles between 
the North and the South leading to an ambiguous foreign policy owing to the two 
environments within which it operates. The ambivalence in South Africa 's foreign policy 
is a flllction of drawing from two different and sometimes conflicting environments so 
The enthusiasm subsequent to 1994 created a myth that rejoining the international system 
meant benefits for South Africa. Such a perception understated the challenges and 
setbacks of being part of an international system. It also led to a Department of Foreign 
Affairs (DFA) that lacked vigilance in modelling foreign policy, because the international 
environment was not properly understood. The international system is not only about 
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opportunities, but it is also about challenges to foreign policy makers . The lesson for the 
South African Department of Foreign Affairs is that of understanding the complexities of 
the intemational political and economic system if realistic foreign policy goals are to be 
established. 
Despite South Africa's desire to export its political culture globally, it is thwarted by an 
inevitable need to galvanise regional and intemational support if it is to be successful. 
Without such support, influence in the region will remain an wlfealisable goal and 
prospects for attracting wealth will also be bleak. In tum the domestic and regional goals 
such as economic growth, unemployment and eradication of conflict will remain an 
unachievable wish list. Without them being achieved the intangibles such as the 
protection of human rights, good govemance and democracy become meaningless. This 
means that the conduct of foreign policy is not easy, but has to be balanced such that it is 
not exercised in a manner that compromises all these important intemational agendas. 
An understanding of the restraints imposed on countries like South Africa by the 
international political and economic system would lead to informed criticism of South 
Africa's foreign policy. It has been argued that South Africa continues flawlting human 
rights slogans as the linchpins of its foreign policy and yet fails to intervene in places 
afflicted by lawlessness like Zimbabwe. Relations with countries like Cuba and Libya, 
which are infamous for their appalling human rights records, have also been subjected to 
such sharp criticism. Analysed with the context of Political Structuralism this alleged 
" Williams, P. "South Af,ican Foreign Policy: Getting Critical", Politikon, 2000, 27 (I) p. 76 
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foreign policy fai lure is a function of the political and the economic structure of the 
intemational system. 
3.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has examined the principles that fonn the foundation of South Africa 's 
foreign policy. It has also gone on to demonstrate the reasons for the lack of consistency 
between stated foreign policy goals and the actual foreign policy behaviour. It has tried to 
place this lack of coherence between foreign policy and foreign policy behaviour under 
theoretical scrutiny. In tenus of this analysis, the hypothesis posed in the preliminary 
chapters stands. The structlU'e of the intemational system, as suggested by political 
structuralism explains the prevalent ambiguity in foreign policy. The multi-issue agenda 
and global ising intemational system has created a challenging terrain for the development 
and making of foreign policy. Finally, the argument is then used to draw some lessons 
that such theoretical scrutiny yields. It is hoped that these will have some relevance in 
foreign policy analysis and making in South Africa. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
A CASE STUDY APPROACH OF INCONSISTENCIES IN POST 
APARTHEID SOUTH AFRICA'S FOREIGN POLICY 
4.1 Introduction 
Even though South Africa abolished apartheid and adopted democracy the practical 
application of its liberal principles became problematic. The optimism of a South 
Africa that would play a meaningful role in the democratisation process 
internationally turned into a spectacle of irony on a number of cases. This has opened 
South Africa's foreign policy to criticism that South Africa's behayiour does not 
capture the principles upon which it is purportedly founded . 
This chapter tests this inconsistency by exammmg South Africa's foreign policy 
towards China, Lesotho, the Great Lakes and Swaziland. The state of democracy and 
politics in general in these four cases since 1994 are research topics on their own. 
However, here they are considered to reflect on the challenges South Africa faces in 
the area of foreign policy. 
South Africa has conducted itself in a manner that departs from the principles of 
democracy, human rights, non-aggression and peace that are central to its politics. 
Nevertheless, it must be mentioned that South Africa is not an exception in so far as 
the rift between foreign policy discourse and foreign policy behaviour is concerned. 
The importance of criticism levelled against South Africa's inability to strike a 
balance between discourse and how it actually behaves is acknowledged. However, 
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what seems to be critically pertinent IS the theoretical analysis of such an 
inconsistency. It is within this context that in the ultimate analysis this chapter moves 
from the premise that South Africa is symptomatic of a country operating in an 
intemational system of states. An intemational system whose political and economic 
structure thwart foreign policy aspirations of middle powers like South Africa 1• 
4.2 CASESTUDY I: Foreign Policy Towards China After 1994 
South Africa's recognition of China is one of the cases that reflect on the country's 
inability to unambiguously in1plement the liberal principles central to its foreign 
policy. Secondly, it also serves as an insightful case for testing the validity of the 
hypothesis underpinning this study, that South Africa's behaviour is mostly an 
antithesis of its stated foreign policy principles. It is thus imperative for us to revisit 
the decision that was made by South Africa to recognise the People ' s Republic of 
China, in that it allows for an exposition of the inherent contradictions of South 
Africa's foreign policy. 
The history of the division between People's Republic of China and Taiwan is 
documented elsewhere by experts in the field of international relations of China and 
the broader Asia-Pacific. Here the intricacies of this division will only be a departure 
from the central pW1Jose of the chapter. A brief background will nonetheless be given 
I Schrire and Si lke argue that "for small states the restraints imposed by the international system tend 
to weigh more heavily". See Schrire, R & Silke, D "Forei gn Poli cy. The domestic context", in M. 
Muller & W Carisnaes. 1997. Change and South Africa' s external relations. ITP: SA, p. 3. 
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as it pertains to South Africa ' s foreign policy principles2 People's Republic of China 
in Beijing had claims over the whole of China and regarded Taiwan as province of 
China and the Republic of China (ROC) as a local authority of the island. Beijing 
(PRC) favoured the unification of the two entities on its telms). Furthermore, they did 
not want any diplomatic recognition of this island. According to them coexistence of 
two systems, on the premise of one China, socialism on the mainland and capitalism 
on Taiwan was possible and the two could develop side by side for a long time 
without interference from either side 
On the other hand, Taiwan (ROC) had since 1960s argued for self-determination. 
During the 1960s some native Taiwanese, upset by the rule of the mainland minority, 
began to call for independence from China. It was during this time that focus shifted 
from reclaiming the mainland to developing the island itself. Despite developments of 
the 1990s from military to diplomatic offensives by China against the renegade 
province there were still disagreements regarding the terms on which the two entities 
were going to be unified. Taiwan did not accept the entire proposal that was put 
forward by Beijing, including the "one China, two systems proposal,,4 as it came to be 
known. Instead, Taiwan wanted to take its place in international relations as an 
independent actor in its own right. 
2 It seems as if South Africa completely departed from its commitment to human rights in recogn ition 
ofa country that has a repressive regime that is not committed to democracy. 
3Sreytenbach. W. "The Chinese Dilemma: Dual Recognition is The Ultimate Solution" in South Africa 
Journal or International Affairs, Vol. 2, No. I, Summer 1994 
4 Lai To, L. "A history of the PRC 's Policy Towards Taiwan", in SAllA and FOD, 1995. South Aflica 
and the two Chinas Dilemma. SAIIA & FOD Publication (Johannesburg). 
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TIns situation created a dilenuna for South Africa, a country whose main objective 
was to rejoin the international conununity without any fornls of discrinlination 
against certain states. The People's Republic of China was one of many countries that 
were interested in opening diplomatic ties with the new South Africa, while Taiwan 
on the other hand was a partner with South Africa prior the 1994 elections. The issue 
was further complicated by the fact that Beijing had supported anti-apartheid 
movements, including the ANC. 
This dilemma spawned new and intense debates within the country and abroad 
concerning the route South Africa ought to follow. These debates revolved around the 
possibility of South Africa retaining ties with Taiwan at the risk of neglecting its 
economic interests in China. This would have been a decision contrary to that made 
by other nations of the world with which South Africa wants to forge friendly 
relations. The option of breaking ties with Taiwan in favour of China also had its 
problems such as closing economic links and decreasing the chance of Taiwan's 
independence5 
While the debates were going on, Chinese officials periodically visited Africa and 
proclaimed South Africa as a gateway to many parts of the continent. The Chinese 
president Jiang Zemin alluded to the importance of Sino-African relations as China 
shares common concerns and history of colonialism with Africa 6 Despite this 
5 Geldenhuys, D. 1997. The Politics of South Aflica's China Switch", in Issues and Studies 3/7, July, 
p.IIO. 
6 Payne, Rand Vency, C. "'China 's Post Cold War Africa Policy", Asian Survey, Sept. 1998, p 870. 
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cornnl0nality of interests China is a repressive government in which opposition forces 
are violently dealt with. 
Taiwan on the other hand democratised in the 1990s to become one of Asia's free, 
rich and stable democracies. It also played a crucial role in funding the ANC 
government after 1994. All these factors ought to have counted in its favour in the 
recognition issue. As a country founded on principles of freedom and democracy, 
South Africa was expected to be inclined more towards a like-minded country. Indeed 
the situation was a test case for South Africa's foreign policy makers. It is at iliat 
juncture that the values of human rights, democracy, peace and respect for law should 
have been practically and coherently affirnled. During the consideration of People's 
Republic of Chinas recognition Taiwan had not declared itself independent of PRe. 
PRC could have thus been pressurised to adopt democratic politics, as was the case in 
Taiwan before it could be recognised. 
However, this was not the case as South Africa announced its recognition of China in 
1996. Upon deeper consideration of the recognition of China it seems that South 
Africa neglected is cornnlitment to values of human rights and democracy. South 
Afi"ica could not implement its morally charged foreign policy due to demands placed 
on it by political and economic imperatives. It makes economic sense to forge ties 
with China, which has, "1,2-billion people, fast-growing economy and a lucrative 
market,,7 Furthermore, South Africa is active within international fora such as OAU, 
Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), and the UN system. It is incumbent on South Afi'ica 
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to ensure that it forges ties that are consistent with its role in international affairs8 
South Africa is also one of the African countries seeking a permanent seat in the UN 
Security Council. China 's loyalty towards Africa, its position in the UN Security 
Council could pay dividends towards the realisation of this goal9 It seems political 
issues amongst other factors had an influence in the decision South Africa made in 
favour of China. This is the reality of the international system with which South 
Africa's ambitious foreign policy goals need to come to telms. 
South Africa's decision could also be conceptualised in terms of its econOlmc 
interests. South Africa's position compels it to forge ties with partners from which it 
can derive foreign direct investment (FDI), without which economic demands of 
South Africans cannot be met. It seems that China's pre-eminent economic position 
had an influence on the decision to switch away from Taiwan. In addition to the size 
of its economy, China has a double-digit growth rate and shows signs that it is 
increasingly becoming one of the world's powerful economies. Its economic strength 
was fmther increased by the incorporation of Hong Kong in 199710, making many 
countries around the world interested in maintaining formal diplomatic ties with it. 
7 Mail and Guardian, 8 December 1995. 
8 Statements from the South African presidency imply that South Africa was driven by its role in 
illtemational relations to recogn ise China. This is precisely consistent with what this research is 
advancing. South Africa's foreign policy is determined largely by the strictures of the International 
system. See, "South Africa's relations with The Greater China", Statement Issued by the Office of the 
President, 27 November 1996 (www.poliry.org.za/govdocs/pr/ 1996/pr l l27b.hrm l) 
<) According to Van Breda, "The People's Republic of China is already an important actor on the world 
stage and its size gives the country considerable weight in the intcll1ational arena. With 1.2-billioll 
people, or 20% of the world's population, it has played an increas ingly active role with the United 
Nations since entering it in 197 1. See Van Breda, N. 1996. "South Africa Should Decry China ' s 
Record", Mail and Guardian, 27 Sept. 1996. 
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The incorporation of Hong Kong into main land China led to a perceived economic 
pre-eminence creating a positive economic future for China and its trading partners. 
Could it have been a coincidence that South Africa decided to recognise China while 
the incorporation of Hong Kong was looming? It seems that South Africa made this 
decision in line with its economic interests rather than with its commitment to liberal 
values and to which China does not subscribe. 
After 1996 t.rade between South Africa and China has shown a tremendous increase!!. 
South Africa was also attracted by lucrative Chinese markets and shifted focus 
towards the region of Asia. It would have been expected that South Africa will act in 
accordance with its desire of being an influential player in world affairs, by not only 
trading with China. But also by nudging it to be swift in the democratic agenda. This 
would be in keeping with South Africa's commitment to democratisation. The failure 
to act in this manner has led to South Africa being accused of forsaking its moral 
values in favour of doing business with wealthy tyrants! 2. 
4.3 CASE STUDY II: Foreign Policy Towards Lesotho in 1998 
In 1998 Lesotho was characterised by a volatile political dispute over the results of its 
multi-party elections. The Lesotho Congress for Democracy under first past the post-
10 SAIIA & FGD. 1995 South Africa and the Two Chinas Dilemma. SAIIA & FGD: lHB, p. 91 
II According to Business Day, 27 September 1998 South Aflica China trade increased six fold in 1996 
12 See Edmunds, M & Du Plessis, C, "We'll Do Business With Any Tyrant Who Pays", Mail & 
Guardian, April 4, 1997. 
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electoral system won 79 of the 80 seats in parliament. Opposition parties 13 claimed 
that there were irregularities and demanded the resignation of Pakalitha Mosili and 
his cabinet. They mobilised people, called for a stay away and finally threatened to 
seize strategic government properties 14. After weeks of political unrest and fa iled 
mediation by South Africa, the situation deteriorated to a point where the police and 
the military could not contain it. Civil war was ilmninent as the Lesotho Defence 
force was on the brink of staging a coup 15 
It is against this background of protestation and imminent coup d'etat that on 22 
September 1998, South African paratroopers in conjunction with Botswana forces 
intervened in Lesotho. Their mission was carried out under aegis of the Southern 
Africa Development Community (SAD C) peacekeeping initiative. This initiative was 
a result of a request by a Prime Minister Mosili of Lesotho for military assistance 
from South Africa 16 The main goal of the intervention was to restore law and order. 
This intervention raised a plethora of questions and criticism in South Africa and the 
region. These questions revolved around the legality of the operation and South 
Africa's involvement in a militaristic intervention that resembled an invasion. A 
thorough examination of the debates surrounding the intervention shows that this was 
13 l3a50tho Congress Party. Basotholand National Party and Maremtlou Freedom Pat1y claimed that the 
elections were not free and fair. See Neethling, N. "Military Intervention in Lesotho: Perspectives On 
Operation Boleas and Beyond", in Joumal of Peace and Confli ct Resolution, Issue 2.2, May 1999, p I 
14 Mathoma, PT. "South Africa and Lesotho: Sovereign Independence or a tenth province?", in South 
Af,ican Yearbook of Intemational Affairs 1999/2000. SAIIA: Johannesburg, p. 71. 
15 "Regional Security in Southem Africa: Whither the SA DC Organ on Politics, Defence and 
Security?", in Global Dialogue Vo lume 3.3 December 1998. 
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not only regional security dilemma. It was also a serious contradiction inherent in the 
post apartheid South Africa's foreign policy. 
The nature of the intervention, its underlying motives and its consequences, reveal the 
lack of a coherent foreign policy framework on the part of South Africa. Its [South 
Africa] involvement in Lesotho during the 1998 turmoil demonstrates the rift between 
foreign policy and foreign policy behaviour introduced in the preceding chapters. The 
lack of coherence in foreign policy becomes clearer when the Lesotho case is 
examined against the principles espoused in South African foreign policy documents. 
The first critical point pertains to the ad hoc manner in which foreign policy decisions 
have been made and are being made in South Africa. South Africa decided not to 
send troops to the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in 1997 in the name of a 
negotiated settlemene 7 The decision to march into Lesotho contradicted the initial 
commitment to a diplomatic rather than a military approach. The conflict facing the 
DRC was much more serious and endangered the whole region'S, yet it was met with 
a modest response by South Africa. This adoption of an aggressive foreign policy 
stance towards Lesotho while South Africa claims to stand for peace and non-
16 The 1994 SADC Memorandum of Understanding appointed Botswana, South Afri ca and Zimbabwe 
as the guarantors of democracy in Lesotho, but during the time of the crisis Zimbabwe was already 
involved in the Congo Conflict hence its absence. See Global Dialogue, Vol 3.3 December 1998, p. I. 
17 Whi le Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia gave military support towards containing this debilitating 
conflict in the DRC, South Africa ruled out military involvement in favour of a negotiated sett lement. 
See Smith A.D "Clumsy Pretoria Adds to Africa's Troubles", Mail and Guardian, September 24, 1998. 
[8 Burundi, Uganda and Rwanda were at the brink of being pulled into the conflict in the DRC. See 
MutuJl1e, G. "Pretoria Talks Rule Out Anned Intervention''..Maii and Guardian, January 29, 1997. 
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aggressIOn suggests that there is no coherent foreign policy framework 19 Critics 
argue that South Africa participated in the anned intervention to protect narrow self-
interests in Lesotho. Katse and Mohale Dams20 , which were at the brink of being 
taken over by the unruly military, seem to have been compelling factors behind the 
intervention. It seems that the DRC situation was not acted upon with such vigilance 
because South Africa does not have immediate strategic interests there. The problem 
here is that of being unable to strike a harmonious balance between moral principles 
of foreign policy and the pursuit of national self-interest. 
Secondly, the immediate effect of the operation on citizens of Lesotho stands in stark 
contrast with what South Africa's foreign policy discourse proclaims. Maintenance of 
law and order and the creation of an enviromnent conducive to peaceful resolution of 
the conflict21 were not created. Violence that characterised the aftermath of the 
operation resulted in a volatile political situation. The hope of achieving stability 
thrpugh use of aggressive means reflected the confusion that prevails in South 
Africa's foreign policy. The notion of a South Africa inclined towards peaceful 
mediation of conflicts and democratic consolidation became a hollow aspiration. The 
!9 TIlis lack of coherent foreign policy framework is shown by "a tangle of inconsistencies and 
contradictions that have characterised SOllth Africa's foreign policy since 1994", See Marais, H. 
"Diplomacy Discarded for Intervention: South AtTica Carries a Big Stick", Le Monde Diplomatique, 
March 1999. 
:w Katse Dame fonTIs part of the Lesotho Highlands Water Project in whi ch South Africa invested 
billions of rands. It also serves as the reservoir for the whole of Gauteng Province. See Mathoma, P. 
"South Africa and Lesotho: Sovereign Independence or a tenth province?" South African Yearbook of 
International Affairs 199912000. SA11A: Johannesburg, p. 74 . 
21 The engagement of South Africa and Botswana forces in Lesotho threw the country in an even worse 
political crisis. Looting and violence destabilised the tiny Kingdom. See Van Nieuwkerk, A. "The 
Lesotho Crisis: Implications for South African Foreign Policy", in K. Lambrecht, "Crisis in Lesotho: 
The Challenge of Managing Conflict in Southern Africa". FGD African Dialogue Series, No 2 March 
1999, p. 1. 
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lack of a coherent resolve demonstrated by Operation Boleas22 reflected on the 
inability of South Africa to practically implement its foreign policy principles. 
Thirdly, after 1994 South Africa proclaimed its being part of the continent and the 
sub-region. Its foreign policy discourse alluded to the opening of doors in a 
reconciliatory spirit that was not prevalent under the apartheid government. As a 
democratic country that went through a peaceful exchange of power, South Africa's 
intervention in Lesotho ought to have been guided by principles of negotiation, 
peaceful resolution of conflict and respect for international law23 . It ought to have 
approached this regional security issue in the same manner it addresses domestic 
disputes. On the contrary South Africa opted for an armed intervention giving itself 
the image of a regional aggressor reminiscent of the apartheid South Africa. 
Fourthly, in the view of the Basotho and the region at large, South Africa could not 
swiftly implement its policy of peaceful mediation. The signs of a political crisis were 
visible as early as July 1998, but South Africa failed to take a decisive stance. In the 
build up, prior to the actual conflict, South Africa played a weak diplomatic role. The 
weakness is made indicative by the inabi lity of the Langa Commission24 to release it 
22 The Economist published al1 article titled "The Regions Blundering Bully", pointing to negation of 
highly flaunted diplomacy in favour of a militaristic approach to confli ct resolution. See Economist, 
Vol. 349, issue 8094, 14 November 1998. Operation Boleas was a code name given to the planned 
military intervention of 1998 in Lesotho. 
23 All these are stated aspirations of South Africa's foreign policy. See Van Nieuwkerk, A. "The 
Lesotho Crisis: Implications for South African Foreign Poli cy", K. Lambrecht, "Crisis in Lesotho: The 
Challenge of Managing Conflict in Southern AtTica". FGD African Dialogue Series, No 2 March 1999, 
p. I. 
24 The Langa Commission was comprised of a team of experts from Botswana, South Africa and 
Zimbabwe charged with the responsibility of carrying out an audit of the 1998 Lesotho General 
Elections. However, the Commission's ambivalence in its report tainted its credibil ity. 
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findings on time. There was a belief that the Commission was acting in favour of the 
LCD. Tills compromised South Africa 's impartiality on the diplomatic front. And this 
lack of confidence by citizens of Lesotho in South Africa re-invigorated the 
discontent. 
Furthern10re, South Africa 's involvement III the intervention was fraught with 
contradictions. The operation was calTied out under the name of protection of 
democracy. The Lesotho Congress for Democracy gove1Tlll1ent was not accepted as 
democratic in the eyes of many Lesotho citizens. It was an autocratic government that 
was accused of a rigorous vote rigging exercise with a view to prolonging its tenure. 
South Africa's intervention was thus seen as an infringement of democratic right of 
the people to show their discontent25 Whether the elections were rigged or not the 
Lesotho scenario exposed the underlying South Africa's foreign policy problems. It 
revealed South Africa's inability to consistently apply its intentions of promoting 
democratic values externally. 
Finally, the Lesotho inter\"ention became a foreign policy debacle due to its 
questionable legality. This revealed a weakness in South Africa's foreign policy, 
whose discourse flaunts respect for international law as a guiding principle of state 
relations. The operation seems to have been a decision made by few players with no 
25 Many ordinary Basotho saw the invasion as a crude move by South Africa to save an unpopu lar and 
an autocratic government". See Dixon, N. "South Africa Invades Lesotho" 
(http://j illx.sistln,unsw.edll.au/- greelllft/ 1998/336/336p21.htl11 ) 
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proper consultation within SADC and the United Nations Security Council (UNSC)26 
This made the intervention a unilateral action shrouded in a cloak of a multilateral 
initiative can-ied under the aegis of SADC27 The Lesotho intervention was more than 
jllst a regional security issue. It also revealed the rift between South Africa's foreign 
pol icy and foreign policy behavioill'. 
4.4 CASE STUDY III: Foreign Policy Towards the Great Lakes after 1994 
South Africa is situated in a continent that has become a "theatre28" of conflicts in the 
post Cold War order. One of the major foreign policy challenges for South Africa lies 
in the realm of conflict resolution and peacekeeping in Africa. South Africa 's post 
apartheid aspirations of championing a ' renaissance' of the continent have been held 
hostage by the escalating conflicts in the continent. It has become difficult to strike a 
balance between dealing with the challenges posed by conflicts and maintenance of 
foreign policy principles. The "African millennium" touted in the late 1990s by 
President Mbeki is still being delayed by the resource exhausting conflicts in the 
Great Lakes, Sudan, Angola and Sierra Leone29 In the context of this case study the 
consideration of the Great Lakes political crisis affords us an opportunity not only to 
26 Southall, R. " Is Lesotho South Afli ca's tenth province?" in K. Lambrecht, "Crisis in Lesotho: The 
chall enge of managing conflict in SOllthem Africa. FOD African Dialogue Series, No.2 March 1999 . 
27 The then acting president Mangosuthu Bulhelezi consulted with a few SADC presidents, 
giving the impression that the intervention was sanctioned by SADC. See Seiler, J. "Is 
military peacemaking really possible?" Mail & Guardian, April 2 1999. 
28 Le Pere, K, Lambrechts, K and Van Nieuwkerk A. "TIle Burden of the Future: South Africa's 
Foreign Policy Challenges in The New Millennium", Global Dialogue, Vol 4.3 , December 1999. 
Institute for Global Dialogue: South Africa, p. 5. 
2',1 In an address at South African Institute of International Affairs, South Africa's Foreign Affairs 
Minister Nkosazana Zuma refelTed to the conflicts in the DRe, Angola, Sierra Leone and Sudan as the 
remaining chall enges of South African foreign policy. See Zuma, N "Address by Foreign Affai rs 
Minister", in South African Joumal of lntemational Affairs, Vol. 8, No.2 , Winter 2001, p. 21. 
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search for a solution. It also allows for introspection into South Africa 's foreign 
policy inconsistencies. 
A fully-fledged discussion on the intricacies of conflict in the Great Lakes warrants a 
research topic of its own. For purposes of relevance to this discussion the crisis in the 
Great Lakes will be traced back to the period after 1994. This is so due to the fact that 
the idea is to test the post 1994 inconsistencies of South African foreign policy. 
The current conflict in the Great Lakes region started with the increasing unpopularity 
of the Mobutu Sese Seko's dictatorial regime in Zaire. Mobutu 's unpopularity 
increased while the 1994 genocide in the neighbouring Rwanda caused countless 
Hutus to seek refuge in Zaire. Mobutu supported Rwandan rebels in their strike 
against the Rwandan Tutsi led government. Rwanda and Uganda on the other hand 
sponsored a rebel group called Alliance of Democratic Forces for Liberation of 
Congo-Zaire (ADFL) led by Laurent Kabila to overtln'ow MobutuJO Rwanda and 
Uganda had their own interests of ensuring a buffer zone around their borders, 
making it impossible for the rebel groups to gain easy access into their respective 
countries. In the face of increasing pressure, imminent military clash and Angola's 
involvement in backing of Kabila, Mobutu fled from Zaire on 17 May 1997. On 20 
May 1997 Kabila declares himself the president and renames the country Democratic 
Republic of Congo (DRC). This signalled an intensification of African problems, 
which later challenged South Africa's foreign policy attempts of playing a 
preponderant role in the consolidation of democracy and peace in the continent. 
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Kabila's assumption of power which elevated hopes for democratic change in the 
DRC later turned into a spectacle of irony as he failed to control the Rwandan rebels. 
He became an enemy of his former allies, Rwanda and Uganda who began supporting 
an insurgency against him. He also started sponsoring and anning the rebels who 
were fighting against Rwanda and Ugandall . A situation that began as a series of 
unrelated domestic political problems, turned into a regional crisis as the whole of the 
Great Lakes region got drawn into the conflict. 
The situation in the Great Lakes region not only challenged South Africa's foreign 
policy principlesJ2 It also presented South Africa with an opportunity to exercise its 
stated foreign policy goals. However, there have been problems with the way in 
which South Africa exercised it foreign policy with regards to the Great Lakes region. 
The manner in which South Africa initially dealt with the conflict in the Great Lakes 
at one level shows the inability to convert principles into a coherent and practically 
implementable policy. It also demonstrates the constTaints within which states have to 
exercise foreign policy. In tlus regard, delving into South Africa's inability to put 
broad foreign policy aspirations coherently into practice is not sufficient. There is a 
need to explain this rift between the foreign policy aspirations and the actual 
behaviour with respect to this particular case study at a theoretical level. In its 
JO Leader, J.E "The Congo Crisis" A speech Delivered at the World Affairs Council of Greater Fort 
Walth, Texas, 30 April 2001 
31 Leader, J.E "The Congo Crisis" A speech Delivered at the World Affairs Council of Greater F0I1 
Walth, Texas, 30 April 2001. 
32 Conflicts of the type seen in the Great Lakes region militate against the practical implementation of 
the principles of human rights, democracy and good governance, which South Afl;ca proclaims. See 
Evans, R " The Humanitarian Challenge. A Foreign Policy Perspecti ve", in African Security Rev iew, 
Vol 6, No.2, 1997. Publication of the Institute for Security Studies: South Africa, p. I . 
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ultimate analysis the chapter seeks to undertake a conceptual clarification of this 
apparent ambiguity in South Africa's foreign policy. 
The initial foreign policy towards the Great Lakes revealed inconsistencies that are 
part of the difficulties involved in South Africa's search for a role in the continent}] 
One of South Africa's failures in this case was the inability to get involved 
constructively during the transition from Mobutu to Kabila in the ORC, where the 
regional conflict emanated. Furthermore, given the fact that South Africa endorsed 
Kabila it was only logical to get involved early in the region. This way South Africa 
would have been able to ensure that it could playa role in the democratisation of the 
Congo after Mobutu. Instead South Africa seems to have been reluctant to get too 
deeply involved in politics of the Congo. 
In 1998 when the signs of a crisis were visible it adopted a non-interventionist 
approach and refused to play the part of peacemaker. On the other hand Zimbabwe 
and Angola took the initiative of sending troops to prop up Kabilal 4 The 
fragmentation within SAOC regarding the ORC and Great Lakes reflects not only on 
a regional security problem, but also on South Africa's weak foreign policy. Given its 
desire to become an active role player in ridding the continent of conflicts South 
Africa ought to have been the provider of direction and a unifying force, rather than a 
J~ According to Kornegay, F. & Landsberg, South Africa 's foreign policy towards the Great Lakes is 
linked to other regional policy issues. Despite a desire to playa meaningful role, South Africa did not 
want to be seen as a playing the role of bully in the region and in Africa as a whole. See Komegay, F 
& Landsberg, C. "From dilemma to detente: Pretoria 's Policy Options on the DRC and Great Lakes" 
Centre for Policy Studies Policy Brief No. I I, Apri l 1999. 
34 Marais , H. "South Africa Canies a Big Stick: Diplomacy Discarded for Intervention" in Le Monde 
Diplomatique, March 1999 
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complacent player. South Africa did very little to prevent developments that are not 
compatible with its vision in the Great Lakes. 
Furthermore, squabbles between South Africa and Zimbabwe seem to have played a 
role in militating against a coherent policy in the Great Lakes. "Being at odds 
regarding the modalities for resolving the conflict in the DRC and Great Lakes,,35 
brought problems in the search for a solution to the crisis. South Africa should have 
been at the forefront in establishing a framework within which consensus between 
SADC countries regarding conflict in Africa could be reached. However the 
looseness of SADC as a regional body and the diversity of views regarding what 
ought to be done in the Congo militated against attempts by South Africa. From a 
critical perspective it can be argued that South Africa ought to have reconfigured the 
region and fOlmulated a consistent regional policy towards the Great Lakes. 
Preoccupation with regional power politics such as the one between South Africa and 
Zimbabwe has also diverted South Africa's attention from the initial concerns with 
peace in Afi·ica. It is now also concerned with presenting itself as a friendly partner 
that does not seek to dictate terms for others, while it seeks to lead at the same time. 
This means that the African foreign policy environment also restrains South Africa's 
attempts. 
Without muddling two separate case studies, South Africa's initial stance not to get 
involved in DRC and Great Lakes compels us to refer to the Lesotho intervention. 
3S Malan, M. "Regional Power Politi cs under Cover of SADC- Running Amok With A Mythical 
Organ" Institute for Security Studies Occasional Paper No. 35, October 1998. 
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South Africa's emphasis on negotiated settlement in the DRC and Great Lakes 
conflicts in the name of not wanting to destabilise an already volatile situation 
seemed plausible. However, adopting the same approach that was discarded in the 
Great Lakes case towards Lesotho was a contradiction of an earlier commitment to 
negotiations. In the light of an unstable political situation it created, the intervention 
was an antithesis of what South Africa stands for in terms of its foreign policy 
discourse3". This is yet again evidence that South Africa's foreign policy is unclear 
and erratic in that it is applied in a contradictory fashion in many cases37. 
4.5 CASE STUDY IV: Foreign Policy Towards Swaziland After 1994 
Swaziland is the only kingdom in Southern Africa that has not adopted mUlti-party 
politics38. There is the absence of democratic institutions and public accountability 
due to a system that entrusts the King with absolute power39 This situation has seen 
the country experiencing political unrest since the 1980s. The wave of democracy that 
blew across the world led to such a form of authoritarian rule being challenged by 
forces of democracy. The 1990s saw an increasing political activity under the banner 
of People's Democratic Movement (PUDEMO). Pro-democracy strikes became 
36 According to Southall the intervention was a "diplomatic-cum military bungle, which precipitated an 
orgy of arson, looting. violence which left the streets of Maseru a burnt shell with mayhem affecting 
other towns. Southall, R. "SADC Interventi on in Lesotho: An Illegal Defence of Democracy? 
Unpublished Paper, Department of Politic a! Studies, Rhodes Uni versity, p. ! . 
37 According to Anthony Holiday, " the upshot has been that, instead of a foreign policy, we have a 
hopeless mix of so-called "pragmatismtl , so-called "realism!! and general ad hocery that prevents us 
from making our own initiatives", See Holiday, A. " Foreign Policy? What Foreign Policy?", ill Mai l 
& Guardian, September 8, 1998. 
J8 Africa Soutb oftbe Sahara 2001 (30'h ed). Europa Publications: London, p. 1128. 
J<) The Kingdom of Swaziland has been a constitutional non-party state since 1978 with the king 
wielding virtually absolute power 
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frequent in this tiny kingdom that is partially surrounded by South Africa. The King 
made attempts at trying to resolve the situation by establishing a structure called the 
"Vusela,,40 whose aim was to deal with the transformation issues in Swaziland. 
However the genuineness of the King 's attempts regarding democratic reforms were 
soon questioned as he appointed controversial figures to the structure. Protests 
continued and were followed by violent response from the police. PUDEMO rejected 
the "Vusela" due to the failure by the King to meet their demands, which included41: 
(i) Introduction of an interim government 
(ii) Suspension of the state of emergency by the government 
(iii) A carrying out of a constitutional referendum 
(iv) An introduction of a Constituent Assembly to oversee the drafting of a 
new Constitution. 
Subsequent deliberations by the King seemed to have been geared not towards true 
democratic reforms, but at strengthening the monarch. This led to further unrest in 
Swaziland whose far-reaching implications affected not only domestic stability, but 
also the region as a whole. In 1992 political activity increased with the informal 
alliance between Human Rights Association of Swaziland (HUMARAS), Swaziland 
Youth Congress (SWAYCO) and PUDEMO. The main task of this alliance was to 
push for full democratisation of Swaziland. Pressure to reform Swaziland from the 
international community, including South Africa, mounted in the mid-1990s. As early 
as 1995 Mande1a attempted to playa role in the reform process in Swaziland through 
private meetings with the King42 . In the same year the country was brought to a 
40 \\Yuse!a" is a Swazi word for greetings and was used in this case to refer to a team appointed by 
King Mswati to carry out consultations amongst the people of Swaziland and then report b ack. ThlS 
has oeen dissolved and re-formed two times due to the controversial nature of its legitimacy and 
commitment to constitutionalism in Swaziland, 
41 Africa South of the Sahara, 2001 (30'" ed). Europa Publications: London 1129 
" North Africa Region Analysis "Mandel a and a new role for peace", 23 August 1997 . 
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standstill by a two-day strike organised by the Swaziland Federation of Trade Unions 
(SFTU) . 
Due to this increasing domestic and regional pressure to reform, the King established 
a Constitutional Review Commission (CRC) in 1996. However, in its early stages the 
commission drew controversy as pro-democracy movements questioned its 
credibility'] High-ranking figures withdrew from the commission due to its lack of 
cOllUnitment to change. By 1997 no progress was made and people were still being 
arrested for participating in political gatherings. Civil unrest ensued affecting the 
turnout to the 1998 elections. The Commission has to date not made an adequate 
report on its progress; instead, the King is still using his power to silence those who 
seek constitutional reforms44• 
This political state of affairs in Swaziland is not only a challenge facing Swazi 
citizens. It is also a challenge to the basic tenets of democracy, human rights and 
good governance upon which regional integration ought to be predicated. For 
example the manner in which power is exercised in Swaziland is the antithesis of the 
values for which South Africa stands. South Africa is thus being called upon to 
ensure that it begins preaching the values it pw-ports to stand for in the region. As 
mentioned, Swaziland is the only southern African country without an elected 
43 The King's brother was appointed as one of the leading figures of the commission leading to lack of 
confidence on what it can achieve on the refonnatory front. See Africa South of the Sahara (301h ed), p. 
1130. 
44 A dissident group operating under the umbrella of Swaziland Solidarity Network (SSN), 
campaigning against Mswati from offices in the South African cities of Johannesburg. Ne\spruit and 
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government45 It would have been expected that South Africa would put to practice its 
commitment to issues of democratisation, respect for law and human rights in the 
case of Swaziland. However, South Africa has played a modest role concerning 
disregard for civil and political rights in a country geographically sihlated literally in 
its borders. 
The long gestation period of the constitutional reforms in Swaziland is indicative of 
lack of commitment to democratisation. The initial date for the report by the eRe 
was supposed to have been in August 1998. However the process has been moving in 
circles with the report date being postponed almost every year. Five years after the 
eRe was established next to nothing has been achieved46 . A situation of this nature 
calls for South Africa's constructive engagement in Swaziland. Due to its experience 
in the terrain of democratic transformation, its role would be invaluable in the 
constitutional revIew process. South Africa's regional policy states that it is 
intimately linked to Southern Africa and will conduct itself to the benefit of the 
region. However, this aspiration has thus far remained a rhetorical device in that it has 
not been put into practice in the case of Swaziland. 
Durban is indicati ve of a lack of such tights as free speech and freedom of the press in Swaziland. See 
Aflica News Service, February 19, 2001 (www.allafri ca.com/slories/ 200102190376.html) 
45Swazis are barred from exercising their right to elect their representatives or to change their 
govcmment freely. All of Swazi land's citi zens are subjects of absolute monarch Mswati Ill. Royal 
decrees carry the full force of law. The king rejected an offici al 1993 report suggesti ng multi-parti sm. 
See Hlatshwayo, V. "The Mirage of Democracy in Swaziland", in Mail & Guardian, November 8, 
1999. 
4 () It is clear that the review process is not going to yield results so long as those who try to initiate 
debate within the eRe about constitutional principles and qualitati ve people's input are labelled as 
obstructionists. 
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South Africa has trade relations with Swaziland through the Southern African 
Customs Union (SACU) and SADC. The Swazi economy is heavily reliant on South 
African imports47. It is at this level that South Africa could force Swaziland to 
consider democratic refOlms. Moreover, lack of democracy and accountability m 
Swaziland will militate against political cooperation without which solid regional 
integration cannot take place. It is thus in the interest of South Africa and the region 
that democratic transformation becomes a reality Swaziland. It is here that South 
Africa's stated foreign policy goals could be put to practice. Otherwise, adherence to 
liberal values propounded in the South African constitution and foreign policy 
documents will continue to be criticised as a payment of lip service rather than a 
genuine commitment. Indeed, this case shows that Sonth Afi'ica seems to have 
asserted these values rhetorically since 1994 without implementing them. 
Despite the adoption of a foreign policy that is sensitive to a multi-issue agenda and 
the non-state oriented nature of the international system, South Africa continues 
finding itself being militated against by enduring features of the international system. 
One of these features is that of enduring sovereignty of states, which continues to 
restrain South Africa's attempts to promote democratisation in many African 
cowltries. The flaunting of sovereignty by the Swazi government has been a 
militating factor against South Africa's attempts to speed up the process of 
democratic change in that country. As a result, seven years into South Africa's 
47 Swaziland sends over 50% or its exports to South Africa from whom it receives almost all its 
imports. See "Swaziland Overview", ill Mbcndi InfOlmation for Africa (www.mbcndi.co.za). 
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democracy in Southem Africa, promotion of democracy remains an un-implemented 
verbal aspiration. This is a reflection not only of a failure of South Africa's foreign 
policy, but also of enduring statehood militating against South Africa 's foreign policy 
geared towards a pluralistic and transnational intemational system. 
4.6 A conceptual evaluation 
Ambiguities in foreign policies of states including that of South Africa should be 
understood within the context of interstate politics and struggle for survival. It is here 
that a theoretical interpretation of South Africa's foreign policy becomes imperative. 
A mere exposition of cases where Sonth Africa has behaved ambignously and in an 
ad hoc manner48 is an insufficient narrative of South Afi-ica's foreign policy 
problems. It has to be reinforced by a theoretical conceptualisation of why South 
Africa's foreign policy behaviour departs from values upon which it is supposedly 
founded. At this juncture a conceptual evaluation that captures the stated hypothesis4 9 
of the research is provided. This is not done with a view to justifying South Africa ' s 
foreign policy inconsistencies. On the contrary it is done to give clarity and substance 
to criticisms that have been levelled against South African foreign policy makers. 
In the case studies some failures resnlting from the manner in which foreign policy is 
conducted have been identified. From a theoretical point of view these failures are 
48 Van Nieuwkerk, A. "War in the Democratic Republic of Congo- Where to South Africa'? Global 
Dialogue Volume 3.3 December 1998 
49 The hypothesis stated in the preceding chapters of this research states that, despite being predicated 
on liberal principles, South Aflica's foreign pollcy is thwarted by the realities of the international 
system of states. 
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captured by the conception advanced by political structuralismso It seems in all four 
cases that it is not a deliberate attempt by the Department of Foreign Affairs to 
mislead the world about South Africa 's intentions. South Africa is committed to all 
the values stated in foreign policy documents. What seems to militate against the 
actual implementation of these values are restraints inherent in the international 
system. South Africa is not the only country that rhetorically promotes liberal 
principles, while acting in a manner that contradicts themSl . This is evidence that the 
structure of the international system imposes some limitations on states, albeit in 
different ways, given their different power capabilities, positions and geographical 
location. 
South Afi'ica's attempt to promote liberal values and to play the role of a peacemaker 
seems to be thwarted by a number of factors. Firstly, South Africa's middle power 
position is critical in determining what it can or cannot achieve in the international 
system52 South Africa is situated in the developing world, yet it has features of a first 
world country. It is one of the economically powerful countries in Southern Africa 
and Africa, yet it also has more than a quarter of its population living in abject 
so Political Strucralists view the international as anarchic and as having a decisive impact on how states 
behave. See Viotti , P & Kauppi, M. 1987. International Relations Theory: Realism, Pluralism, 
Globalism and Beyond. Macmillan Publishing Company, Inc: USA. 
51 The United States of America is a typical example of this. It claims to stand for democracy, freedom, 
non-aggression and human rights. TIle most striking example is the bombing of innocent ci vilians in 
places like Iraq, the Balkans and recently in Afghanistan. This is a radical departure from the basic 
tenets underpinning its foreign policy. 
52 Solomon argues that the concept of a middle power is elusive. However, it does provide an in sight 
into South Africa's position as a new pl ayer in a globalising world. See Solomon, H. "South Africa's 
Foreign Policy and Middle Power Leadership" Published in ISS Monograph No 13. Fairy Godmother, 
Hegemon or Patiner'? May 1997 
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poverti3 . This makes South Africa a country straddling between the rich and poor 
nations of the world. In international affairs it plays the role of a conciliator between 
the big and small powers54. South Africa occupies an ambiguous position within the 
international political economy. The occupation of this ambiguous position means 
that two different and conflicting environments inform South Africa's foreign policy. 
This leads to an inevitable ambiguity in its foreign policy behaviour55 
Due to its middle power position and inclination towards playing a conciliatory role 
in international affairs South Africa extends relations to all countries of the world. It 
is new in international politics and can do no other, but to embrace all states, big and 
small in its quest to create a peaceful international system56 It is in this context that it 
has not been able to keep countries like the People's Republic of China at arms 
length. Its position in the international system is suited to the use of diplomatic 
engagement rather than distancing offenders. The gap between foreign policy and 
foreign policy behaviour should thus be viewed in terms of South Africa's position. It 
should be conceptualised within the context of the limitations imposed on a middle 
power seeking to win friends and find a niche in an anarchic international system. 
53 Kalenga. P. "Trade and Industrial Integration in Southern Africa: Pitfalls and Challenges". Global 
Dialogue Volume 4.3 December 1999. Also See May, J. "Poverty and Inequality in South Africa", 
Report Prepared for the Office of the Deputy President and Inter-ministerial Committee for Poverty 
and Inequality, 13 May 1998. 
54 See Solomon, H. "South Africa's Foreign Policy and Middle Power Leadership", in ISS Monograph 
No. 13, Fairy Godmother of Hegemon? May 1997. 
55 Bischoff, P-H. "Explaining ambiguity? South Africa and projection of a pluralist middle power". 
Paper presented at the 4[h Pan-European Intemational Relations Conference, University of Kent, 
Canterbury (UK), 8-10 Scptember 2001. Also see Vale, P. "South Africa: Understanding the Upstairs 
and Downstairs", in A.F. Cooper (ed). 1997.Niche Diplomacy: Middle Powers After the Cold War. 
Macmillan Prcss Ltd (UK), p. 209. 
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Commitment to conciliation and multilateralism mllllIlllses the possibility of a 
country like South Africa adopting a unilateral approach in the conduct of is foreign 
policy. According to Solomon, "a middle power, by itself is unlikely to have 
overwhelming influence on the international stage. As such, middle power leadership 
is, in essence, multilateralist in approach,,57. This means that South Africa's position 
prevents it from out rightly condemning and breaking links with People's Republic of 
China. The only way that would be beneficial to South Africa would be to 
constructively engage with China. This is one perspective by which the decision to 
recognise China could be conceptualised. 
Given South Africa's political and economic priorities, it has no other choice but to 
forge ties with big players such as People's Republic of China if it is to have support 
within international fora and achieve economic growth. South Africa also seeks to 
represent the developing world within structures such as the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO). The world system is such that weaker states need to act in 
coalition in order to have a voice in these structures 58 . Forging ties with a country like 
China, which is sympathetic to the developing world, is one step towards 
consolidating a coalition of Southern states with similar interests. 
56 Bischoff, P-H & Southall, R. "Early Foreign Policy of the democratic South Africa", in S. Wright 
(cd). 1999. African Foreign Policies. Boulder, co: Westview Press 
57 See Solomon, H. "South Africa's Foreign Policy and Middle Power Leadership", in ISS Monograph 
No. 13, Fairy Godmother of Hegemon? May 1997. 
58 According to Wood, "Middle powers tend to form alliances or coalitions either with great powers or 
states in their own region". See Wood, B. "Towards North-South Middle Power Coa litions", In C. 
Pratt. Middle Power Internationalism: North-South Dimension . McQuill-Queen's University Press. 
London. An example is of this is that of countries like South Africa negotiating with big powers under 
the banner ofNAM within the UN and WTO. 
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Economically, South Africa IS not a major attractor of foreign direct investment 
(FDI). With the increasing marginalisation of Africa from the world economy 
investors have switched from Africa to the Asia-Pacific region. Other countries of the 
world are also consolidating bilateral and multilateral relations with the Asia-Pacific 
region and with China in particular. Opting for a different route, while it is in 
desperate need for FDI, will only be detrimental to South Africa. According to a 
report by the Economist Intelligence Unit, "foreign direct investment flows into the 
Asia-Pacific region had I;sen dramatically each year since 1992,,59 Countries in 
Africa inevitably have to learn from the Asian economies if they are to have a 
positive future in international affairs. South Africa is one of those African countries 
that have to strengthen ties with the Asia-Pacific region in order to have access to its 
markets. Due to China's pre-eminent position in that region a strong relationship 
between South Africa and Beijing is one way to go towards the achievement of this 
goal. China can also serve as a gateway to this economically booming region of the 
world. South Africa also has to learn from the Asian Renaissance, if it is to 
successfully playa part in Africa 's own economic renaissance. In a nutshell, the 
international political and economic system is such that South Africa's foreign policy 
principles are sometimes incompatible with attainment of a meaningful economic ro le 
in international affairs. It is within the political and economic imperatives placed 
upon a country like South Africa by the international political and economic system 
that post apartheid South Africa's foreign policy ambiguities should be understood. 
59SizAsian News, 22 February 2001, Foreign Direct Investment in Asia to increase", 
(hgp_~jww~:..biz'lsia_~om/g~~l_~rti_£J~sL§.!and art.htn1 ?ac= 1 3D'p~:-_~) 
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The case of South Africa's foreign policy towards Lesotho in 1998 could also be 
interpreted within the context of an international political and economic system 
structured against its wishes. Given its geographic location in Southern Africa, South 
Africa needs to play a much bigger role in the resolution of conflicts in the sub-
region. Given its economic and military capacity, situations like the Lesotho case, call 
for South Africa to assume the role of a leader. It is in part its dominance in terms of 
resources and military power within the region, that South Africa got involved in the 
CrISIS. 
Moreover, South Africa seeks to champion the resolution of African crises by 
Africans. Given Africa's marginal position in international political and economic 
affairs it is the responsibility of South Africa as a regional power to ensure prevalence 
of stability in the region. Furthermore, instability in Lesotho would have had 
repercussions for South Africa as it literally surrounds this Southern African country. 
It is due to the recognition of geographic location and the responsibility of ensuring 
stability that is imperative for attraction of foreign direct investment and flow of 
goods within the region that South Africa took it upon itself to get involved in 
Lesotho. 
South Africa also seeks to aid the consolidation of stable democracies in Southern 
Africa and Africa in general. However, the country's newness and lack of experience 
in international political and economic affairs also constrains it from affectively 
achieving its intended foreign policy goals. South Africa does not want to impose 
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itself on others due to its history, yet it has to play the role of a leader. Striking a 
harmonious balance between these two delicate arenas is also a cause of foreign 
policy inconsistencies. In an intemational system in which South Africa is required to 
lead, but at the same time expected not to impose itself, there can only be inevitable 
circumstances in which ambiguities and blunders prevail. It is in this context that 
South Africa ' s departure from the basic principles that purportedly infonn its foreign 
policy were undermined in 1998 with regard to Lesotho. 
South Africa's foreign relations should also be seen within the context of power 
politics whose continued dominance exist side by side with cooperation between 
states. Disputes between South Africa and Zimbabwe conceming the Organ for 
Politics Defence and Security of SADC have led to a lack of a coherent regional 
security approach6o These disputes are but enduring and inherent state-to-state 
competitions over influence. In Southem Africa they are exacerbated by the loose and 
fragmented structure of SADC. Some of the fourteen members are not entirely 
committed to regional cooperation. In a political and economic system still govemed 
by the pursuit of national interest states are forced to fend for themselves and South 
Africa is no exception. "Operation Boleas" was thus carried out in an enviromnent 
that is also not immune from power politics in which states wrestle for influence. As 
part of this competitive enviromnent South Africa is also compelled to struggle to 
assert its influence. Features inherent in the intemational system compel a country 
60 "SA DC to wrest security organ from Mugabe", in The Zimbabwe independent, August 10, 2001. 
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like South Africa to behave in a manner antithetical to the foreign policy principles 
that espouse democracy and non-aggression. 
South Africa's foreign policy towards the region is also driven by a desire to maintain 
stability. Political crises in Africa have led to millions of people being displaced as 
refugees. In the case of Lesotho the possible destination for refugees is South Africa. 
Despite the fact that South Africa is economically dominant in the region, it is faced 
by its own domestic poverty related problems. Influx of refugees into the country 
would place pressure on the already limited resources. South Africa's involvement in 
Lesotho in 1998 should be seen in the context of an aspiring regional leader 
attempting to avert this scenario. This means that South Africa is compelled to 
"sacrifice its commitment to liberal values if the maintenance of order at home 
becomes imperative,,61 . 
Due to South Africa's recent assumption of a position in the international system it 
seems that it has not found a consistent foreign policy orientation. The ad hoc manner 
in which similar situations are acted upon differently attests to that fact that South 
Africa is yet to adapt in an anarchic international system. This was the case with 
foreign policy towards the Great Lakes region. After failing to find followers in the 
case of Nigeria, South Africa had to act with circumspection. Even if South Africa 
wants to use its foreign policy instruments it is militated against by the fact that its 
has to win friends and maintain solidarity in an often undemocratic and illiberal 
61 Pfi ster, R. South Atiica's Recent Foreign Policy Towards Africa: Issues and Literature, Centre for 
Intemational Studies: Zurich, p. 12. 
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Africa. The effectiveness of South Africa's foreign policy in Africa is thus 
"neutralised,,62 by the inevitable need for support and fear of being perceived as "un-
African,,63 
This conceptual evaluation has shown that what seems to be a failure to implement 
foreign policy principles can be explained through an understanding of the restrictive 
nature of the international system. At one level, the end of the Cold War did not 
completely erode certain features of the international system. Whilst borders play less 
of a role in the North, sovereignty especially in Africa and Asia remains an enduring 
feature of the international system despite the much-touted fact of globalisation. 
However, at another level and in the context of Afi'ica the end of the Cold War has 
led to the emergence of intra-state conflicts as opposed to interstate conflictsM The 
muddling of Cold War and post-Cold War features in International Relations has 
become a perplexing factor for South Africa's foreign policy, geared towards a 
transnational world. South Africa's modest role in Swaziland shonld be seen within 
the context of this complexity of the international system. Even though South Africa 
would like to involve itself in ensuring speedy reforms in Swaziland, the government 
of Swaziland is quick to refer to its sovereignty being infringed upon by South Africa. 
This thwarts South Africa's commitment to the promotion of democracy within 
Southern Africa. South Africa is thus caught between wanting to facilitate reforms in 
62 Bischoff, P-H . "Explaining Ambiguity? South Africa and the projection of pluralist middle power", 
A paper presented at the 41h Pan-European Intel11ational Relations Conference University of Kent, 
Canterbury (UK), p.2. 
63 Bischuff, P-H. "Explaining Ambiguity? South Africa and the projection of pluralist middle power", 
A paper presented at the 4th Pan-European International Relations Conference University of Kent, 
Canterbury (UK), p. 13. 
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Swaziland and respecting Swaziland's sovereigntl5 It seems that South Africa's 
multilateral foreign policy will have to contend with enduring features of the 
intell1ational system such as sovereignty. 
Many countries in Southell1 Africa have in the past been victims of South Africa's 
apartheid policies. With the demise of apartheid this legacy became a challenge to the 
new govell1ment's regional policl6 It continues to affect the decision and the 
manner in which South Africa behaves in the region. As part of its move away from 
a, "dominant and coercive player to a benign hegemon,,67, South Africa is caught 
between wanting to be active in the region and being cautious not to dictate terms to 
its neighbours. This enduring perception of South Africa as a coercive hegemon 
makes it difficult for it to get involved in the case of Swazi.land, in case it is viewed as 
a regional bully. Here South Africa is also limited by the fact that it has to be cautious 
within the region lest it be perceived as a dictator or an "alien" power. 
64 "The Strategic environment", Draft White Paper on National Defence for the Republic of South 
Aftica, chapter 4. 
65 During a visit to the Kingdom of Swaziland South Africa's deputy President was quoted saying that, 
"South Africa respects the sovereignty of her neighbours and cou ld not act as "big brother" in their 
affairs, and wi 1\ let the people of Swaziland solve their own prob lems". See The Star, 2 I February 
2001. This appeal to sovereignty has militated against South Africa's foreign poli cy also in the case of 
Zimbabwe, where ZANU PF insists that Zimbabweans themselves should deal with the land issue 
without the interference from South Africa. 
66 Ralinala, R.M & Saunders, C. "South Africa 's Regional Policy Approach 1994-1999", in African 
Foreign Policies in the 21 " Century. Working Papers Published by Africa Institute: Pretoria, p. 53. 
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4.7 Conclusion 
South Africa has the potential to contribute to the betterment of international 
relations. Its recent achievement and continued consolidation of democracy makes it 
a potential candidate for championing human rights, peaceful resolution of conflict, 
democracy and good governance. However, it has on a number of occasions behaved 
in a manner incongruent with the values for which it purportedly stands. This chapter 
has not only tried to demonstrate this ambiguity, but has also conceptualised it. The 
apparent gap between foreign policy and foreign policy behaviour is explained within 
the context of the structure of the international system. As a middle power, South 
Africa's "interests in the international system remain wide and diverse,,68 While it is 
geographically situated in Africa, a developing part of the world, it also has interests 
in the industrialised world69 Tills means that it has to straddle between North and 
South. It is in essence operating in two different and conflicting worlds, a situation 
that impedes on the formulation of a coherent and consistent foreign policy. 
South Africa's nliddle power position means that it also has to concern itself with 
issues of economic development both at home and on the African continent. It is this 
67 Pfister, R. "South Africa's Recent Foreign Policy Towards Africa: Issues and Literature", Centre for 
Intemational Studies: Zurich, p. 14. 
68 Bischoff, P-H. "Explaining ambiguity? SOllth Africa and the projection of pluralist middle power", 
p.2. 
69 South Africa is increasingly forging ties with the Northern States. The bilateral trade agreement 
between Pretoria and The EU is one such example, where South Africa's straddles between friends in 
the region and the industrialised world. See Landsberg, C & Komegay, F. "The African Renaissance: 
A quest for Pax Africana and Pan Africanism", in South Africa and Africa, FGD Occasional Paper No. 
17, October 1998, Braamfontein: South Africa 
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understanding that has prompted the African renaissance 70 proj ect, which also 
informs South Africa's foreign policy towards Africa. South Africa realises that the 
liberal values that were touted immediately after 1994 will remain meaningless 
without achievement of economic well being by South Africans and Africans alike. 
This creates an inevitable situation in which economic pragmatism (without which 
the promotion of normative principles remains weak) has to be the main driver of 
South Africa's foreign policy. Its position as a middle power puts South Africa in a 
situation where it has to pursue two contradictory projects. On the one hand it has to 
pursue a progressive and a liberal agenda. Whilst on the other it is compelled by its 
position to also pursue an economic project that departs from the normative principles 
of democracy. This means that it has to maintain a precarious balance between liberal 
principles and economic expediency. In such a situation there are bound to be 
occasions on which South Africa is not always forthcoming with respect to the 
promotion of the values it adopted after 1994. It is in this context that the ambiguity 
of South Africa's foreign policy is conceptualised. 
70 The Afl;can renaissance project 1S being championed by South Africa's president Thabo Mbeki. It is 
informed by a belief that, "Africa's potential, both human and natural, is not measuring up to her place 
ill the global political economy. It is within this context that South Africa has been calling for new 
paradigm of development In Africa. This is a development that will begin with appreciating what exists 
ill Africa, how it can be used for development, how it can be built upon and what complimentary 
eff0l1s can come from outside as detelmined by social forces within Africa", See Anyang' Nyong'o, P. 
"Preconditions and prospects of an African renaissance: A view from East Africa" in Development and 
Cooperation, No.3, May/June 200 t. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter undertakes to summarise the findings of this research as they pertain to the 
conceptual clarification of the apparent contradiction between South Africa's foreign 
policy and foreign policy behaviour. It is acknowledged that indeed South Africa's 
foreign policy behaviour is not congruent with the values upon which a democratic 
country is founded. However, this thesis has demonstrated that the ambiguity of South 
Africa's foreign policy can be attributed to the structural constraints imposed on the 
country by the anarchic nature of the international system. It is thus within the context of 
political structuralism as a theoretical framework that the apparent ambiguities in South 
Africa's foreign policy should be conceptualised. 
One of the major concluding points put forward here is that of the lessons for South 
African foreign policy makers and analysts . There has been a lot of criticism regarding 
the incoherent and ambiguous manner in which South Africa conducts itself both in the 
continent and the world in general. Indeed this criticism does playa pivotal role given the 
fact that in a democracy foreign policy should be for the people. However, such a 
criticism needs to infOlID the country as to the paradignl that should guide it in the 
process of executing foreign policy. It is in this context that it is argued that there is a lot 
that South Africa has to learn before it can reconcile its foreign policy goals with the 
imperatives imposed on it by the international system. FurthelIDore, in an international 
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system dominated by major powers, a middle power like South Africa needs to fine tune 
its foreign policy such that it can harness the complicated international enviromnent to its 
benefit. 
5.2 Summary of findings 
The end of the Cold War and that of apartheid in South Africa created a new environment 
not only for pol icy makers, but also for scholars of international relations. States were no 
longer constrained by the struggle between dominant forces of capitalism and 
communism. International politics went beyond the one confined to state-to-state 
relations, but it now saw the emergence of non-state actors . There was increasing belief 
among international relations scholars that, due to crumbling state borders and blowing 
winds of democracy, the internal disposition of states will determine how they behave. 
A democratic country like South Africa for example was expected to draw on its history 
against apartheid and its democratic values in the conduct of its foreign relations. 
Moreover, South Africa's foreign policy documents after 1994 indicated a desire to base 
its relations on liberal principles consistent with the emerging international system. This 
led to foreign policy analysts declaring the declining importance of state-centred theories 
in favour of globalist conceptions of international relations. However, it became apparent 
that the immediate post 1994 euphoria had its limitations' . Despite the stated foreign 
policy goals, South Africa fell short of implementing the basic principles that are 
I Aj ulu, R. 1995. South Africa and the North/South: Pragmatism versus Principle". In C. Landsberg, G. Ie 
Pere and A. van Nieuwkerk ... Mission Imperfect: Redirecting South Africa's Foreign Pollcy". 
Johannesburg: Foundation for Global Dialogue, and Centre for Policy Studies, p. 46. 
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supposed to guide its international relations2 This has led to the problem of trying to find 
a conceptual framework within which the ambiguity of South Africa's foreign policy 
could be explained. This thesis has in part tried to gather the theoretical pieces that have 
been shattered by the end of the Cold War and the complexity of the international system 
that subsequently emerged. 
It demonstrates that the structure of the international system, not domestic factors , is the 
key in shaping behaviour of states. But, South Africa is also a middle power located in 
the developing world. It has its own economic problems such as unemployment and gross 
inequalities3• This means that South Africa is at the bottom of a competitive and grossly 
unequal global political and economic system. Due to the fact that the international 
agenda is determined by the economically powerful there are limitations on what South 
Africa can or cannot achieve. Even though promotion of universal liberal values is one of 
its priorities, it is compelled by its position to focus on issues of economic growth that are 
imperative for the consolidation of democracy at home. It has to respond to undemocratic 
states in Africa and Asia in order to build coalitions in the South to promote change in 
world politics. The international system is such that South Africa is required to give 
secondary importance to universal liberal values if and when its survival and that of 
Southern states with which it shares interests becomes imperative" 
'See Bi schoff, P-H. "Explaining the ambiguity? South Africa and the projection of plurali st middle power", 
a paper presented at the 4th Pan-European International Relations Conference, Universi ty of Kent, 
Canterbury (UK), 8-10 September 2001 , p. 2. 
, Ban'ell, 1-1. "Black Elite Benefit Most From Democracy", in Mail & Guardian, January 31,2000. 
4 Pfister, R. South Afri ca's recent fore ign policy towards Africa: Issues and literature, Centre for 
Intel11ational Studies: Zurich, p. 14. 
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It has been shown that these structural constraints can be conceptualised within the 
theoretical assumptions advanced by political structuralism. For them, the international 
system is dominated by great powers, placing limitations on what middle powers like 
South Africa can do unilaterally. The strength of national values that South Africa 
espouses is minimised by South Africa's position5 This means that the imperatives of the 
international system are such that it will be counter to South Africa's national interest to 
focus entirely on the promotion of universal liberal values. 
South Africa does not confine its quest for econonuc growth and development to 
domestic affairs. It also recognises that its political and economic elevation should take 
place concurrently with that of the African continent with which it is inextricably linked. 
By virtue of being a middle power it also plays the role of a bridge between the 
developing world and the industrialised one in the North6 While it needs solid coalition 
of states, which will champion the needs of the developing world vis-a-vis the North, it 
also has to forge relations with Northern states to strengthen its position in the 
international hierarchy of states. This means that in the conduct of its foreign policy it 
responds to two different environments, leading to the apparent ambiguity between 
foreign policy and foreign policy behaviour7 
5 Baylis, J & Smith, S. 1997. The globalisation of world politics: an introduction to intemational 
relations . Oxford : Oxford University Press, chapter 9. 
6 Bischoff, P-H. " Explaining the ambiguity? South Africa and the projection of pluralist middle power. A 
paper presented at the 4th Pan-European International Re lations Conference, University of Kent, Canterbury 
(UK), 8-10 September 2001. South Africa needs confidence of African states for example for the 
reallsation of an African Renaissance. By the same token it cannot distance itself from the industrialised 
countries given its quest for foreign direct investment emanating from the North. 
7 Sec Bischoff. P-I-l. "Explaining the ambiguity? South Africa and the projection of pluralist middle 
power", p.4. 
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Over and above speaking on behalf of the continent and snb-continent, South Africa is 
also called upon to playa role in the resolution of conflicts that have been ravaging post-
Colonial Africa since independence. Here it has not been able to unambiguously and 
consistently implement its foreign policy principles due to how it is being perceived by 
African states. This is due to the history of apartheid that saw South Africa engaging its 
neigbours in a malevolent and hegemonic fashion. It has been careful not to impose itself 
on its neighbours. Dictating terms will result in a perception that its seeks to conduct it 
relations with Mrica as a regional colonial power. Due to fear of distancing potential 
allies South Africa has been cautious not to bluntly condemn African counh'ies that 
undermine the basic tenets of democracy, as is the case with Zimbabwe, Swaziland and 
Libya. This means that crises that have a potential of developing into fully-fledged 
conflicts are not being dealt with in a manner consistent with the values South Africa 
espouses. It is in the context of the above attributes pertaining to the structure of the 
international system and African foreign policy environment that South Africa's foreign 
policy shortcomings should be understood. 
5.3 Recommendations for foreign policy analysis 
It seems that in formulating a coherent foreign policy, South Africa will have to reconcile 
its universal liberal principles with the realities of the international system. It has to be 
understood by foreign policy makers and analysts alike that it is within the sh'uctural 
imperatives of the international system that South Africa has to operate. Its middle power 
position and inclination towards multilateral cooperation makes it impossible for it to act 
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against those it considers its allies. However, when its survival is at stake South Africa 
does not hesitate to assert its influence even at the expense of the stated desire to resolve 
disputes amicably. An understanding of South Africa's foreign policy from this 
perspective affords us an opportunity to recognise the constraints of the international 
system and the challenges South Africa has to SUlIDOunt in the navigaiion of a meaningful 
role as a middle power. It also gives attention to the limitation of resources necessary for 
the effective execution of foreign policy. It is within the context of limited middle power 
reSOUl'ces that South Africa has to operate. Its ambiguous foreign policy is thus typical of 
a middle power operating in an anarchic foreign policy environment particularly 
prevalent in Africa and Asia and whose structure deternlines foreign policy behavioUl' of 
states. 
5.3 Theoretical Recommendations and conclusion 
The lessons drawn from this research cannot be confined to issues of what should inform 
foreign policy making in the context of South Africa. They run deeper to include 
predominant theoretical debates pertinent in the study of international relations. At this 
juncture it is argued that the pUl'ported move of South Africa's foreign policy beyond the 
pUl'suit of national interest to cooperation and increasing relevance of globalist theories is 
not without limitations. It is the thorough understanding of the world within which South 
Africa operates that will enable the Department of Foreign Affairs to set achievable 
foreign policy goals. Despite the much touted need to situate South Africa's foreign 
policy within the theories that "share a global rather than state centric 
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conceptualisation"S, there is a need to understand and respond to the factors militating 
against its foreign policy aspirations. According to the conclusion drawn from the 
conceptual disputations between pluralism and political structuralism, it seems to be the 
latter that better conceptualises these foreign policy challenges. It is within the theoretical 
assumptions provided by political structuralism that the criticism levelled against South 
Africa concerning the inconsistent manner in which it has applied its foreign policy can 
be given substance. Criticism of South Africa's foreign policy behaviour needs to be 
premised on a conceptual understanding that it is the environment within which South 
Africa operates that determines its foreign policy. It is only tlu'ough that understanding 
that South Africa will be able to make sense of the world within which it has to function. 
The intemational system is characterised by indisputable complexity in that intemational 
relations involves and is intertwined with socio-economic and socio-political issues. 
Despite change and the emergence of a new enviromnent there are persistent questions 
and themes that require us not to discard old methods of foreign policy analysis, but to 
"enlarge our kit of analytic tools"o. It will thus be erroneous to suggest that this world can 
only be viewed through the prism of one school of thought to the exclusion of the others. 
Despite the continued relevance of political structuralism, there are indeed elements that 
it cannot adequately explain. It is in this context that this thesis concludes by 
recommending that a combination of old and new theories could serve the purpose of 
making sense of an ever-changing nature of intemational politics. A rigid approach, 
8 Muller,M & Carlsnaes, W. 1997. Change and South Africa exte111al relations. Intemational Thompson 
Publishers: SA, p. 73. 
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which focuses on a single set of issues, fai ls to adequately explain the complex and 
interwoven nature of international politics. Perhaps an eclectic lO or integrative approach 
sensitive to both old and new issues needs to be adopted in the conduct of foreign policy 
analysis. 
? Rosenau, J. "Introduction: New directions and reClinent questions in the comparative study offoreigll 
po licy", in Kegley, C, Helman, F and Rosenau, J. 1987. New Directions in the study of foreign policy 
Allen & Unwin: USA, p. 3. 
10 Kegley, C, Hennan, F and Rosenau, J. 1987. New Directions in the study of forei gn policy Allen & 
Unwin: USA, Part I. 
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